12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

394.  On 23 April, Ambassador Bremer made a speech in Baghdad addressed to the

Iraqi people.341 He said:

“… many Iraqis have complained to me that de‑Ba’athification policy has been

applied unevenly and unjustly. I have looked into these complaints and they are

legitimate. The de‑Ba’athification policy was and is sound. It does not need to be

changed. It is the right policy for Iraq. But it has been poorly implemented.”

395.  On 26 April, Mr Blair sent a Note to President Bush.342 In it he suggested a number

of ways of improving the situation in Iraq. The first suggestion was:

“Do whatever it takes to get the Civil Defence and police in shape. The Coalition

should hire who we need; pay what it takes; create an officer class that can lead

and knows that it has a huge vested interest in success. Bremer’s speech on

de‑Ba’athification etc was well received. But I’m not sure we really have our entire

system focused on this; and it needs to be …”

396.  Mr Blair also suggested a focus on courts. He wrote:

“… very few cases can be tried at present; judges are subject to real intimidation.

We need to ensure that trials of criminals and sentencing begins again. An

independent judiciary will be a big step forward.”

397.  Those points were reiterated in a video conference on 27 April.343

398.  In early May, following a request from Mr Blair to “look again at progress with

Iraqiisation, particularly training and equipment, and how it might be accelerated”, the

Cabinet Office produced a paper entitled ‘Enhancing Iraqi Security Forces’.344 The

Cabinet Office gave a detailed assessment of the current situation and highlighted the

following elements as the main points:

• There were benefits in taking risks in handing over local control to Iraqi citizens.

• More ex‑Ba’athist army officers might be required (beyond the 4,000‑5,000

there were already plans to recruit).

• The Iraqi police were fully recruited, the focus now needed to shift to specialist

and leadership training.

• “10,000 Iraqi police” were “duds” and needed to be pensioned out of the service.

• More police mentors were required; “we could consider lobbying internationally

for more”.

341  Speech L. Paul Bremer III, 23 April 2004, ‘Turning the Page’.

342  Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 26 April 2004 attaching Note from PM for President Bush.

343  Letter Quarrey to Owen, 27 April 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 27 April: Iraq’.

344  Minute Dodd to Rycroft, 7 May 2004, ‘Enhancing Iraqi Security Forces’.

143