The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on Saddam’s
forces with the intention of occupying specific territory. Allied
air
support
would be required …
“In any
case, we do not assess the external opposition to be capable of
leading
a military
operation as outlined above. They do not have the leverage
within
the
military and security apparatus to realise a plan of this kind, and
leading
oppositionists
are not credible figures for a provisional government. Regime
change
relying
mainly or exclusively on the external opposition is
therefore not
a
viable
option.
“More
realistic calculations suggest that the immediate successor to
Saddam
Hussein
will be a senior Sunni member or ex-member of the Iraqi military
…”
413.
The note on
inspections summarised the history of efforts to get inspectors
back
into Iraq,
examined the future prospects for doing so through clarification of
resolution
1284
(1999), and described the remit of UNMOVIC and the IAEA
(International Atomic
Energy
Agency).150
It
described the “main feature” of resolution 1284 as being that
it
offered
Iraq “a suspension of sanctions in return for co-operation with the
weapons
inspectors,
including progress on key disarmament tasks. Resolution 687 (1991)
had
offered
lifting of sanctions “only when the inspectors say disarmament is
complete”,
which Iraq
regarded as “an unattainable goal”.
414.
The FCO wrote
that Iraq:
•
remained
“determined to escape sanctions without fulfilling its
disarmament
obligations”;
•
had “never
accepted” resolution 1284;
•
continued
to “refuse to allow inspectors to return”; and
•
justified
its position by claiming that resolution 1284 was “so ambiguous”
that
the US
could “easily deny” that co-operation had been
“adequate”.
415.
Addressing the
prospects for the future, the FCO advised that there was
“no
independent
timetable as such” for the return of the inspectors. The “key”
would be
persuading
Iraq to accept resolution 1284:
“While it
is possible that the threat of military action might also prompt a
change
in the
Iraqi position, we have always assumed that the only real prospect
lies in
clarifying
… [resolution] 1284. We recognise there are ambiguities … They
are
there for a
good reason: the P5 was unable to reach agreement. If positions
remain
as
entrenched as they were during … negotiations, there is little
prospect of the
situation
changing, which is why clarification has not been attempted sooner.
But
SCR 1382
[2001] now commits the Security Council to trying.”
150
Note,
[undated], ‘Iraq: Weapons Inspectors’, attached to Letter McDonald
to Manning, 15 March 2002,
‘Iraq’.
460