4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
The effect
of the February 2003 dossier had been “almost wholly
counter-
productive”,
undermining the credibility of the Government’s case for
war
and the
documents that were part of it.
•
Ministers
had not misled Parliament.
389.
The postscript
to the FAC report recorded the continuing absence of
conclusive
evidence
that Iraq possessed WMD:
“Months
after the cessation of the military phase of operations in Iraq, no
conclusive
evidence
has come to light that the regime did indeed possess weapons of
mass
destruction.
The question arises, why were these weapons not used, assuming
they
existed at
all? This is at once one of the most difficult and one of the most
important
questions
the Government has to answer.”
390.
The FCO sent
its initial response to the FAC report in November.191
It deferred
its
response to
the FAC’s conclusions on the 45 minutes claim and the September
dossier
until after
the conclusion of the Hutton Inquiry.192
Both
responses are addressed later in
this
Section.
391.
During his
evidence on Iraq to the Liaison Committee of the House of
Commons
on
8 July, Mr Blair was repeatedly asked about the
Government’s position on
392.
In his
responses, Mr Blair made a number of points,
including:
•
The House
of Commons had not been misled and he stood by the case
which
had been
made for military action “totally”.
•
There was
“no doubt whatever that Saddam Hussein was developing
weapons
of mass
destruction”, and that, when the UN inspectors “finally had to
leave” in
December
1998, “they made it quite clear that in their view ‘unaccounted
for’
meant that
he had not revealed them”.
•
He had “no
doubt at all” that the ISG would find “evidence of weapons of
mass
destruction
programmes”.
•
The policy
of containment “was not working”. Saddam Hussein’s strategy
“was
to conceal
the programmes, to keep the basic expertise in place and then,
the
moment the
threat was lifted to go back to reinvigorating the programmes
again”.
191
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2002-2003, The
Decision to go to War in
Iraq, Response
of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs,
Cm6062.
192
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2002-2003, The
Decision to go to War in
Iraq, Further
Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs,
Cm6123.
193
Liaison
Committee of the House of Commons, Session 2002-2003,
Oral
evidence taken before the
Liaison
Committee on Tuesday 8 July 2003, Qs
146-209.
499