The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
606.
A Force Level
Review conducted in November and given to the Chiefs of
Staff
in December
noted that the military tasks for the period ahead fell into two
categories:
counter-terrorism
and security sector reform, most critically the Iraqi Police
Service
(IPS), the
Border Police (IBP) and the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps
(ICDC):
“Existing
MND(SE) resources are insufficient to maintain security, in the
event of
politically
inspired instability, and simultaneously train, mentor and monitor
both the
ICDC and
the IPS/IPB. In order to achieve the necessary force levels an
adjustment
of in-place
forces coupled with a moderate increase in force levels is needed.
This
should
ensure concurrent CT [counter-terrorism] and SSR [security sector
reform]
success.
Also by achieving early effect, MND(SE) should create the
conditions for
release of
UK troops or their re-employment within Iraq.”343
607.
On
counter-terrorism, the review found that:
“… tasks
have been reviewed and we will soon be able to reduce from four to
three
battalions
for this commitment. The released battalion will be used for the
mentoring
and
monitoring of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).”
608.
The Force
Level Review recommended:
“… the
continued deployment of a surge battalion … until Jun 04. The
deployment
of an
additional battalion … to provide in-theatre flexibility … [and] a
further two
platoons of
RMP [Royal Military Police], until a request for 40 civilian police
is
fulfilled,
to operate in local police stations throughout the AO [Area of
Operations],
in support
of battalion activity to improve the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
and
Iraqi Border
Police (IPB).”
609.
The Chiefs of
Staff were also reviewing the UK’s military strategy for
Iraq.344
A paper
written by Lt Gen Fry in early December suggested
that:
“If
necessary the UK should be prepared to continue to employ
maximum
sustainable
resources up to Land MS(+) and Maritime/Air SS to
deliver
campaign success.”
610.
On resources,
he advised that:
“The UK’s
strategy must be one of ‘early effect’, which puts the achievement
of
campaign
success above all else including concurrency and harmony
guidelines.”
343
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 5 December 2003, ‘Op. TELIC Force Level Review –
Nov 03’.
344
Minute
DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 5 December 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Review of UK
Military Strategy for Iraq’.
308