The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
helping the
economic development of the country.35
He
attributed the UK’s early failures
in Iraq to
insufficient resources being applied to help with economic
reconstruction.
69.
In advance of
the NSID(OD) meeting planned for 19 July, Mr Bowen
advised
Mr Browne
that there were indications that No.10 was keen to use it to reach
a
decision in
principle on the UK’s longer-term engagement in Iraq. An
announcement
would then
be timed for late September, after the report to Congress by Gen
Petraeus
and
Ambassador Crocker.36
70.
Mr Bowen
reported that it had also been suggested that the withdrawal
from
Basra
Palace should be delayed to the same timescale, and be wrapped up
in a single
announcement.
Mr Bowen recognised that this was a “seductive picture” but
there were
“substantial
risks” that Mr Browne would want to weigh:
“To begin
with, there could be real problems in linking the Basra Palace
decision to a
much bigger
decision on the UK presence as a whole. First … keeping a
substantial
presence in
the Palace longer than is militarily necessary could, and probably
would,
cost lives
and injuries. Second, leaving it until after the Crocker/Petraeus
report will
not
necessarily make it any easier to handle with the US …
“The bigger
problem is how we handle the very significant political fall-out
that would
follow a
decision and announcement of UK terms for MND(SE). There is a
serious
risk of
major damage to US/UK relations across a range of security issues
…
Moreover,
we run the risk of undermining our trustworthiness as a close ally
with the
permanent
organs of the US state and armed forces in a way which would do
lasting
damage to
our security … interests.
“Ironically
enough, it could easily be that by the autumn, the US political
picture
could have
changed sufficiently to make it less difficult for us to make
such
a decision/announcement
by doing it in a way which goes with the grain of
US/coalition
planning. The problem with reaching a decision next week is
that:
a.
it is
difficult to see how the PM could not tell the President
…
b. although
we might plan to delay any announcement … there is a
strong
chance that
the decision in principle could leak.”
71.
At the request
of the FCO, on 12 July the JIC assessed the internal dynamics
within
the Sadrist
movement, Muqtada al-Sadr’s political strategy and his attitude to
violence.37
72.
The JIC judged
that al-Sadr’s immediate priority was “to secure (and get credit
for)
a timetable
for the departure of ‘occupation forces’” and that his consistent
refusal to
35
BBC Radio
4, 11 July
2007, Today
Programme.
36
Minute
Bowen to PSSC/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra
Palace and the Longer
Term UK
Posture’.
37
JIC
Assessment, 12 July 2007, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr: Keeping His
Distance’.
196