The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“What
happened during the Charge of the Knights was actually a lot of the
police
collapsed
effectively and it took a lot of time to rebuild them and we tried
to rebuild
them on a
different model, on more what I would call … a paramilitary basis,
so that
they could
fire weapons, defend themselves and restore order as much as
they
could take
fingerprints and gather evidence.”1327
1457.
Lt
Gen White‑Spunner commented on the joint working between the
army and
the police:
“It was
because the police were felt to be less reliable than the Iraqi
Army. The Iraqi
Army has
always been to the fore in Iraq … and there was a feeling that the
police
would be
morally and physically strengthened by having the Iraqi Army
posted
1458.
When asked
whether the police fought against the ISF during the Charge of
the
Knights, Lt
Gen White‑Spunner responded:
“A few,
very few. Some units did very well. I certainly wouldn’t want to be
overcritical
of the
force as a whole … some of his [Maj Gen Jalil’s] units
did very well, but a lot
just put
their weapons down and melted away. Some were infiltrated by
JAM.”1329
1459.
On 8 July, an
eGram from the British Embassy Office Basra reported that
the
operational
phase of Charge of the Knights had ended.1330
“Intelligence‑led
strike
operations”
continued around Basra, leading to the arrest of the second in
command for
the team
that attacked the Contingency Operating Base on 8 May and 8 June.
The ISF
considered
their operation in Maysan a success: the Chairman, two Council
members,
and the
former Chief of Police were arrested for supporting militia and
criminal activities.
They tried
to arrest the Governor of Maysan but he had already
fled.
1460.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Shirreff described how
14th Division was
able to
tackle JAM in the South during the Charge of the Knights, unlike
the locally
recruited
10th Division:
“There was
no way they were prepared to really get stuck in and fight
against
the Jaysh
Al Mahdi, for understandable reasons, and I think it was only when
Iraqi
troops from
outside the Shia south came in that you were able to really
begin
1327
Public
hearing, 7 January 2010, pages 44‑45.
1328
Public
hearing, 7 January 2010, page 45.
1329
Public
hearing, 7 January 2010, page 46.
1330
eGram
26653/08 Basra to FCO, 8 July 2008, ‘Basra: Weekly
Update’.
1331
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 44.
392