3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
620.
Sir David had
also addressed in some detail the importance of a US
commitment
to the Road
Map, for the MEPP.
621.
Mr Straw
spoke twice to Secretary Powell on the evening of 19
February.168
622.
Mr Straw
continued to press for the draft resolution to be tabled after the
weekend,
not before,
and for a vote to take place on 14 March. He and Secretary Powell
also
discussed
the text of the resolution, benchmarks and a possible ultimatum to
Saddam
Hussein
telling him to leave. Mr Straw commended Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s language
in the
draft resolution, stating that the Council “decides the final
opportunity has not been
taken” and
talking more about Saddam Hussein’s obligation for “voluntary
disarmament”.
623.
In the context
of conversations with Palestinian and Israeli
representatives,
Mr Straw
repeated the imperative for publication of the Road Map to secure
Arab
support for
action on Iraq.
624.
President
Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at
the
UN the
following week but its terms were subject to further
discussion.
625.
Mr Blair
telephoned President Bush later on 19 February.169
They discussed
the
positions
of France, Germany and Russia and key regional countries.
Mr Blair said it
was “a
defining moment”.
626.
Mr Blair
repeated the arguments that the resolution and ultimatum route
would help
to
demonstrate that the US and UK did not want war but were prepared
to use force if
that was
the only way to disarm Saddam Hussein. Addressing the question of
whether
disarmament
should be defined for Dr Blix and if identifying tasks for
Saddam Hussein
would allow
Saddam Hussein to do some and try to show he was co-operating,
Mr Blair
said that,
when the resolution was tabled, “we should set out the issues that
were part
of full
co-operation”.
627.
Mr Blair
and President Bush agreed the resolution would be introduced at
the
UN the
following week.
628.
Mr Blair
also set out the reasons for a vote around 14 March. It would be
important
for No.10
and the White House to remain in close contact on communications.
Mr Blair
said that
the resolution and ultimatum route would “help us to demonstrate
that we did
not want
war but were prepared to use force if that was the only way to
disarm Saddam”.
629.
Finally,
Mr Blair underlined the importance of progress on the MEPP to
help
transform
opinion in Europe and the Arab world.
168
Letter
Straw to Manning, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with Colin Powell,
19 February
2003’.
169
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime
Minister’s Telephone
Conversation
with Bush, 19 February’.
291