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3.7  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
620.  Sir David had also addressed in some detail the importance of a US commitment
to the Road Map, for the MEPP.
621.  Mr Straw spoke twice to Secretary Powell on the evening of 19 February.168
622.  Mr Straw continued to press for the draft resolution to be tabled after the weekend,
not before, and for a vote to take place on 14 March. He and Secretary Powell also
discussed the text of the resolution, benchmarks and a possible ultimatum to Saddam
Hussein telling him to leave. Mr Straw commended Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s language
in the draft resolution, stating that the Council “decides the final opportunity has not been
taken” and talking more about Saddam Hussein’s obligation for “voluntary disarmament”.
623.  In the context of conversations with Palestinian and Israeli representatives,
Mr Straw repeated the imperative for publication of the Road Map to secure Arab
support for action on Iraq.
624.  President Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the
UN the following week but its terms were subject to further discussion.
625.  Mr Blair telephoned President Bush later on 19 February.169 They discussed the
positions of France, Germany and Russia and key regional countries. Mr Blair said it
was “a defining moment”.
626.  Mr Blair repeated the arguments that the resolution and ultimatum route would help
to demonstrate that the US and UK did not want war but were prepared to use force if
that was the only way to disarm Saddam Hussein. Addressing the question of whether
disarmament should be defined for Dr Blix and if identifying tasks for Saddam Hussein
would allow Saddam Hussein to do some and try to show he was co-operating, Mr Blair
said that, when the resolution was tabled, “we should set out the issues that were part
of full co-operation”.
627.  Mr Blair and President Bush agreed the resolution would be introduced at the
UN the following week.
628.  Mr Blair also set out the reasons for a vote around 14 March. It would be important
for No.10 and the White House to remain in close contact on communications. Mr Blair
said that the resolution and ultimatum route would “help us to demonstrate that we did
not want war but were prepared to use force if that was the only way to disarm Saddam”.
629.  Finally, Mr Blair underlined the importance of progress on the MEPP to help
transform opinion in Europe and the Arab world.
168  Letter Straw to Manning, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with Colin Powell,
19 February 2003’.
169  Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime Minister’s Telephone
Conversation with Bush, 19 February’.
291
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