The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
428.
The same day,
a JIC Assessment said that Sunni turnout might be as low
as
one third
of the eligible voters, which would give Sunni Arabs a
disproportionately low
representation
in elected institutions.226
429.
The policy
implications of that were, in the view of the JIC, that: “Sunni
outreach
will need
to intensify after the elections to ensure that Sunnis do not opt
out of the
political
and constitution drafting process altogether.”
430.
Sir William
Ehrman told the Inquiry that the JIC had consciously sought to flag
up
to policy
makers the risk that the Sunnis would be significantly
under-represented in the
TNA as a
result of likely low turnout.227
431.
Between 17 and
19 January the UK deployed approximately 350 personnel
from
1st
Battalion, the Royal Highland Fusiliers to Iraq to provide
additional security across
MND(SE)
during the election period.228
They began
returning to Cyprus on 21 February.
432.
In mid
January, senior US and UK officials were discussing the role of the
MNF-I
after the
election, taking account of both security forecasts and the likely
stance of the
incoming
ITG.229
Both the UK
and US Governments considered that it was important to
“strike the
right balance between showing support for the transitional
government and
the
development of the ISF on the one hand, while on the other hand not
giving any
impression
of ‘cut and run’”.
433.
In preparation
for a planned discussion on 20 January on the UK’s
military
contribution
in Iraq, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary told him that Mr Hoon would
want to
discuss the
UK military deployment in Iraq in 2005 and whether to backfill
after the
Dutch
withdrew from Muthanna province.230
He
explained that Mr Hoon wanted to be
able to
tell the US as soon as possible that the UK could not make
significant additional
troop
contributions or take on deployments outside MND(SE).
434.
The Private
Secretary recommended that Mr Blair’s response to Mr Hoon
should
be that “we
will need to handle this issue carefully with the US” and that he
should set
out a
“gameplan” for doing so.
435.
Mr Collis
reported on 21 January that there had been a spate of attacks on
the
election
infrastructure in Basra in recent days.231
Some
election officials had resigned
due to
intimidation. There were reports that some mosques were organising
security
for polling
centres in Maysan and Basra. The Governor in Maysan had declared
no
226
JIC
Assessment, 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections Update’.
227
Private
hearing, 14 June 2010, page 57.
228
Minute
PJHQ-J9 POLOPS 3 to PS/USofS [MOD], 17 February 2005, ‘Iraq:
Withdrawal of EHRR’.
229
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq’.
230
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Geoff Hoon and CDS 1130,
20
January’.
231
Telegram 10
Basra to FCO, 21 January 2005, ‘Southern Iraq: security and
political round-up
13
January-20 January’.
464