9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
depend on
whether the coalition issues a timetable for withdrawal. A small
minority
of other
hard-liners will continue such attacks in any case …
“IV. In the
longer term, JAM members are likely to remain a source of
instability
through
their recovery of criminal power and malign influence over
Shia
communities,
unless military pressure is maintained. There is also potential
for
violence
between the Sadrists and their Shia political rivals, especially as
provincial
elections
approach.
“V. Prime
Minister Maliki … is likely to remain uncompromising towards any
attempt
by JAM or
the Special Groups to continue as a militia, and will repeat the
recent
crackdown
should they try to challenge his security gains.”
192.
The JIC
assessed that Iran was adopting a “more discriminating approach” to
the
provision
of lethal aid to Shia militias, which it was likely to sustain at
least until the MNF
had left
Iraq.
193.
Lieutenant
General Peter Wall, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
(Commitments),
updated the
Iraq Strategy Group on 11 September on the emerging plan for UK
military
drawdown
and transition to US command in southern Iraq.69
In summary,
he said that:
•
At the end
of November 2008, command of Maysan, Muthanna and Dhi
Qar
provinces
would transfer to an expanded MND(C), under US
command.
•
At the end
of March 2009, command of Basra would transfer to a
new
Basra based
US division, MND(South), bringing UK forces there
under
US command.
•
At the
start of May 2009, US forces would begin to deploy to
Basra.
•
By the end
of June 2009, the UK’s departure would be complete.
194.
Mr McDonald
emphasised the need to protect this planning, particularly in the
lead
up to the
US elections, and highlighted the presentational problem if the US
assumed
tasks that
the UK was currently undertaking.
195.
Lt Gen Wall
and Mr Day advised that “the US presence in the South
would
probably
not be engaged in the same tasks that we had been doing”. The US
was likely
to focus
more on border security and on protecting their main supply
lines.
196.
Mr McDonald
told the Group that no further statement by Mr Brown was
planned
for 2008,
although he would like to make one in early 2009.
197.
Mr Brown
and President Bush spoke by video link on 11 September and
Mr Brown
told the
President that the UK would need to be part of a SOFA
deal.70
69
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 15 September 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
11 September’.
70
Letter
Catsaras to Gould, 11 September 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with US
President, 11 September’.
413