The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
686.
In a Written
Parliamentary Question on 28 February, Dr Tonge asked what
financial
provision
had been made to fund the reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath
of war.302
Mr Boateng
replied: “The Government believe that the role of the United
Nations and
other
multilateral institutions will be vital in addressing the
reconstruction of Iraq in the
aftermath
of any war and are liaising closely with allies on this
issue.”
687.
The ‘UK
Vision for Phase IV’ equated the scale of change envisaged for
Iraq
to
post-Communist reforms in central Europe. Success would require
“huge
efforts”,
“a large coalition” and “a lot of time”.
688.
On 26
February, the FCO sent No.10 a set of papers commissioned
by
Sir David Manning:
•
key talking
points for Mr Blair to draw on with President
Bush;
•
a ‘UK
Vision for Phase IV’;
•
an outline
structure for the interim civil administration, already sent
to
Lt Gen Garner;
•
a draft
letter from Sir David Manning to Dr Rice setting out arguments for
a
UN‑authorised
transitional administration; and
•
a list of
“11 good reasons” for a third resolution.303
689.
The papers
were copied to the Private Offices of Mr Brown, Mr Hoon
and
Ms Short,
but it is not clear from the correspondence how extensively they
had been
discussed
with Treasury, MOD and DFID officials beforehand.
690.
It is not
clear whether any of the papers were seen by
Mr Blair.
691.
The covering
letter from Mr Straw’s Private Office to Mr Rycroft
explained:
“You will
see that the key point to make to the Americans remains the need to
have
UN Security
Council authorisation for the civil transitional administration.
There
are signs
that General Franks and Jay Garner … understand this. But
convincing
Mr Rumsfeld
will be much more difficult.”
692.
The proposed
messages for Mr Blair to deliver to President Bush
were:
“– Winning
the peace is important, but more difficult, than winning the war.
We
need to
leave Iraq radically changed for the better.
– We are
committing just under a third of our Armed Forces to the fighting.
We
shall also
be staying on for the ‘aftermath’ – Phase IV. But we shall have
to
302
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 28
February 2003, column 760W.
303
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 26 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Phase IV’.
434