12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
814.
On 26
September, Mr Davies reported that 38 ArmorGroup mentors had
deployed
to
Basra.769
Their roles
included: three personnel in Maysan developing a
criminal
intelligence
database and mentoring the Tactical Support Unit (TSU); five
personnel
based at
the az‑Zubayr Police Academy providing training for the TSU; and
the bulk
of the
remaining staff engaged in mentoring and developing the
investigative capability
of the
Basra investigators.
815.
That
deployment had been planned for June 2004, but on 11 June
Mr Straw
was advised
by a junior official that the deployment should be delayed from
June to
September
because of a decline in security in southern Iraq.770
An
additional factor was
that the
type of mentoring they were contracted for would be “of little
value until the Iraqi
police
ha[d] undergone more specialist skills training”.
816.
Minutes from
an SSR meeting on 7 October reported that ArmorGroup had
all
police
mentors operating in various locations across
MND(SE).771
The
contract was
due for
renewal at the end of November 2004 but it was likely that a
proposal for an
extension
would be submitted based on the positive feedback
received.
817.
A six‑month
extension of the contract was agreed at the Iraq GCPP
Strategy
meeting on
7 January 2005.772
The
Committee agreed that the ArmorGroup contract
for 68
mentors costing £4.8m should have “specific reporting procedures,
including
monitoring
and evaluation” with a “clearer work plan”. The project would be
reviewed
again after
six months.
818.
On 12 October,
an email from a junior FCO official confirmed that 12 US IPAs
had
been
deployed to MND(SE) in late September: six to the Sector and
District Command,
two to the
traffic unit, two to the forensic unit and two to the
TSU.773
819.
On 14 October,
Mr Simon Collis, British Consul General in Basra, wrote to
the
FCO in
London stating: “we need help in the form of more senior police
officers, flexible
security
rules for their deployment, less nationalist policies on behalf of
MNF contributors
and more
specialist trainers and equipment.”774
He also
highlighted limited co‑ordination
between
civilian and military structures in MND(SE).
820.
Lt
Gen Rollo, who left MND(SE) in November, told the Inquiry
that:
“Not all
the Iraqis were ineffective. We focused on getting relatively small
numbers
of them
to a relatively good standard.”775
769
Minute
Davies, 26 September 2004, ‘Weekly Report Number: 46’.
770
Minute ISSU
[junior official] to PS/SofS [FCO], 11 June 2004, ‘Iraq –
Deployment of Police Monitors’.
771
Minutes, 7
October 2004, Security Sector Reform meeting.
772
Minutes, 7
January 2005, Iraq GCPP Strategy meeting.
773
Email FCO
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 12 October 2004, ‘Basra
Update’.
774
Telegram
169 Basra to FCO London, 14 October 2004, ‘Southern Iraq: Putting
Civilian Police First’.
775
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 12.
241