4.4 | The
search for WMD
the
Intelligence and Security Committee before it, and that of the
Foreign Affairs
Committee
before that, found the same thing. No one lied. No one made up
the
intelligence.
No one inserted things into the dossier against the advice of
the
intelligence
services. Everyone genuinely tried to do their best in good faith
for
the country
in circumstances of acute difficulty. That issue of good faith
should
now be
at an end.
“But there
is another issue. We expected – I expected – to find actual
usable
chemical or
biological weapons shortly after we entered Iraq … Lord Butler, in
his
Report,
says: ‘We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at
this stage
that
evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical
agents, or even
of banned
missiles, does not exist or will never be found.’ However, I have
to accept
that, as
the months have passed, it has seemed increasingly clear that, at
the time
of
invasion, Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological
weapons ready
to deploy.
The second issue is therefore this: even if we acted in perfectly
good faith,
is it now
the case that in the absence of stockpiles of weapons ready to
deploy, the
threat was
misconceived and therefore the war was unjustified?
“I have
searched my conscience … to answer that question. My answer
would
be this:
the evidence of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction was indeed
less
certain and
less well founded than was stated at the time … However … he
retained
complete
strategic intent on WMD and significant capability … He had no
intention
of ever
co-operating fully with the inspectors, and he was going to start
up again
the moment
the troops and the inspectors departed, or the sanctions eroded. I
say
further
that if we had backed down in respect of Saddam, we would never
have
taken the
stand that we needed to take on weapons of mass destruction, we
would
never have
got the progress on Libya, for example, that we achieved, and we
would
have left
Saddam in charge of Iraq, with every malign intent and capability
still
in place,
and with every dictator with the same intent everywhere
immeasurably
827.
Mr Blair
commented on the Butler Report’s statement that:
“… with
hindsight making public that the authorship of the dossier was by
the JIC
was a
mistake. It meant that more weight was put on the intelligence than
it could
bear, and
put the JIC and its chairman in a difficult position. It recommends
in
future a
clear delimitation between Government and the JIC, perhaps by
issuing
two
documents. I think this is wise, although I doubt that it would
have made
much
difference to the reception of the intelligence at the time. The
Report also
enlarges on
the criticisms of the ISC in respect of the greater use of caveats
about
intelligence
both in the dossier and in my foreword, and we accept that
entirely.
464
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
14 July 2004, column 1431.
587