The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Sector
Control Point (SCP): Baghdad;
•
Joint
Captured Materiel Exploitation Centre (JCMEC):
Baghdad;
•
Task Force
Disablement and Elimination (TF D/E): Baghdad;
•
Coalition
Operating Base – Irbil (COB-I); and
•
Coalition
Operating Base – Basra (COB-B).
445.
In a note on
30 August, Mr Blair requested an immediate and
longer-term Iraq
strategy
dealing with the situation on the ground in Iraq, how we improve
it, how we
improve the
system for dealing with it; and WMD.244
“… this
must tie in with the way we deal with Hutton. I assume that though
the judge
may be
critical of certain aspects of our handling, he will basically find
for us. That
may be
optimistic. But if right, Hutton must be the chance to get our
integrity back
on Iraq. So
whatever NS [Sir Nigel Sheinwald] does must include a timetable
that
incorporates:
Hutton, Interim Report on WMD, improvement in Iraq, and other
WMD
issues (eg
Iran, NK [North Korea] and Libya).”
447.
Mr Straw
informed Parliament on 1 September that:
“Coalition
forces and specialist personnel of the Iraq Survey Group are
actively
pursuing
sites, documentation and individuals connected with Iraq’s weapons
of
mass
destruction programmes. We are investing significant effort in the
search.
The process
will be painstaking.
“There have
been some successes: the discovery of mobile laboratories which
bear
a striking
resemblance to those described in US Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s
presentation
to the UN Security Council in March 2003; and the recent recovery
of a
large
quantity of documents relating to Iraq’s nuclear programme together
with parts
of a gas
centrifuge which had been hidden since 1991 by an Iraqi scientist
formerly
engaged on
Iraq’s nuclear programme. We anticipate that more scientists
previously
employed on
Iraq’s WMD programmes will start to come forward with
evidence
and equipment.
“Any finds
clearly must be very carefully analysed and assessed. This process
is
continuing.
When we have collated the evidence, it will be presented
appropriately
448.
On
3 September, Mr Sebastian Wood, Counsellor for External
Affairs at the British
Embassy
Washington, informed Mr Scarlett that the US Government was
bracing itself
for a
disappointing report from Dr Kay.246
The Embassy
was stressing to the US the
244
Note
[Blair], 30 August 2003, [untitled].
245
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
1 September 2003, column 809W.
246
Letter Wood
to Scarlett, 3 September 2003, ‘Pre-Conflict Intelligence on
Iraq’.
514