6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
“The first
elections would be local. The goal of the Transitional
Administration will be
to create
an environment in which national elections are possible. After
elections,
the
Transitional Administration will be able to hand over to an elected
national
government.
“We believe
that, contrary to the assumptions sometimes made, the
Transitional
Administration
will be able to draw on a relatively competent Iraqi civil
service.
The Iraqi
civil service has continued to function through several regime
changes,260
and we see
no reason why it should not do so again, with changes at the
highest
level
only.”
603.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that, if there had been “even more focus” on
planning,
the UK
“would still have been focusing essentially on the humanitarian
side, with an
assumption
that we would inherit a functioning civil service infrastructure,
and it was that
assumption
that proved to be wrong”.261
The UK
“didn’t plan for … the absence of this
properly
functioning civil service infrastructure”.
604.
In response to
Mr Blair’s question about the role of the UN in the new
government,
the FCO
stated that any Transitional Administration would require UN
Security Council
authorisation.
605.
The FCO
advised that UN involvement would also be needed to:
•
provide the
legal mandate to reform and restructure Iraq;
•
secure
international and regional support;
•
bring in
the IMF and World Bank;
•
adapt the
OFF and sanctions regimes; and
•
verify WMD
finds and destruction.
606.
The FCO added
that the Coalition would still need to lead on security, and
that
Security
Council authorisation would be required for both civilian and
security functions.
607.
DFID answered
the fourth of Mr Blair’s questions, on humanitarian issues and
the
UK plan to
address them.262
The
department advised that the scale of the humanitarian
crisis
would depend on the nature of the conflict. A key priority was
therefore to minimise
risks to
civilians, infrastructure and, in order to protect Iraqi revenues,
oil production.
DFID
emphasised that:
“There is
more scope to refine the
Coalition military options and minimise
these
risks. If this is
not done, the consequences … are potentially too great for
the
international
humanitarian system to plan on current resources.”
260
It is not
clear what this referred to. The Ba’athist regime had been in place
since 1968.
261
Private
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 180-181.
262
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 26 February 2003, ‘Political and
Military Questions on Iraq’ attaching
Paper DFID,
24 February 2003, ‘DFID Input to Prime Minister’s questions of 20
February’.
417