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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Revolution in Iraq] might be tempted to go public with these assurances to
strengthen their hand. This would have a negative impact on the Sunnis but they
would be in a stronger political position and therefore the impact would be less than
it might otherwise have been. We would then make clear that we were not bound by
these assurances, given the expressed will of the National Assembly chosen in free
and fair elections. We would have to contend with the unhappiness of the UIA but
they would have been warned of the consequences of such an action.”
Al Qaida declares war
On 14 September, the leader of Al Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared an
“all‑out war” on Shia Muslims in Iraq in response to a US–Iraqi offensive on the town of
Tal Afar.95
On 18 September, Lt Gen Brims’ weekly report to Gen Walker recorded the impact of this
declaration.96
A series of 12 car bombs in Baghdad had increased the number of attacks there by
almost half. The weekly casualty numbers rose by 122 percent, and 479 of the 782 people
killed were civilians. Although al-Zarqawi claimed the attacks in Baghdad, Lt Gen Brims
observed “we should not under-estimate the extent of involvement of local Iraqi insurgents
in planning and executing many of the attacks”.
191.  On 15 September, the JIC produced an Assessment covering the draft Constitution
and Sunni violence, at the request of the ISOG.97 Its Key Judgements included:
“I. Many leading Sunni figures are unhappy with aspects of the draft Constitution …
At the grass-roots many Sunnis wish to vote: most who do are likely to reject the
draft.
“II. It is unlikely that the Sunnis can mobilise a two-thirds majority against the draft in
the requisite three provinces …
“III. Actions of the insurgents will be critical to the size of the Sunni vote. The hard
core of the insurgents … see the political process as a threat and will try to disrupt
the referendum. Their continued violence will inhibit the turnout by Sunnis; less so by
Shia.”
192.  On 16 September, the IPU advised Mr Straw and Sir Michael Jay, FCO Permanent
Under Secretary, that the frequency and sophistication of attacks in Basra was
increasing and the British Embassy Office Basra was locked down.98
95  Al Jazeera News, 14 September 2005, Al-Zarqawi declares war on Iraqi Shia.
96  Minute Brims to Walker, 18 September 2005, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (179) 18 September 05’.
97  JIC Assessment, 15 September 2005, ‘Iraq: the Draft Constitution and Sunni Violence’.
98  Minute Jeffrey to PS [FCO], 16 September 2005, ‘Basra Security Situation’.
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