The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
deployed in
the province in an attempt to subdue it. The locals claim that
they, rather
than
coalition forces ‘liberated’ Maysan in 2003, and this helped
explain the higher
levels of
hostility to MND(SE) than elsewhere in the region.”1372
1501.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Shirreff said:
“Maysan had
always been a very difficult province. There was effectively no
security
at all
where MNF were concerned.”1373
1502.
On 9 July
2004, Commander Kevin Hurley, UK Senior Police Adviser Iraq
(South),
reported
that the Governor of Maysan province, Governor Riyadh, had been
“implicated”
in the
shooting of the local Chief of Police.1374
Cdr Hurley
wrote that the Governor’s
continued
tenure was “a potential challenge to not only the development of a
wholesome
policing
ethic but also that of the wider democratic process”.
1503.
On 24 July,
Mr Collis reported that Maysan province was fragile and stuck
in
“political
stagnation”.1375
Although
Prime Minister Allawi had suspended Governor
Riyadh, the
Governor refused to acknowledge it and continued in his role.
Mr Collis
attributed
the “bad” economic situation to “35 years of neglect and the
overnight loss of
its
previous principal employer, the old Iraqi Army”. The deployment of
police mentors
was “likely
to be problematic on security grounds”.
1504.
By 28 July,
Mr Collis wrote that the situation had
“worsened”.1376
A
suspension
letter
issued from Baghdad had been sent through low‑level police
channels, rather
than from
Prime Minister Allawi, meaning Governor Riyadh either had not seen
the
instructions,
or was ignoring them. The Governor’s behaviour was causing concern
for
some
Council members and Mr Collis predicted that, without further
action, he would
“continue
to undermine those he sees as rivals and the scope for violence
w[ould] rise”.
1505.
On 3
September, Mr Collis wrote that a cease-fire was agreed between the
local
Office of
the Martyr Sadr (OMS) leadership, the IPS and ING on 2 September
and a
declaration
was signed.1377
Key points
included a commitment to resolution 1564 (2004)
(allowing
MNF freedom of movement whilst undertaking reconstruction work and
IPS
training),
and the IPS being given “the responsibility of upholding
security”.
1506.
Mr Collis
wrote that Maysan was still without an effective
Governor.
The Governorate
Council was incapable of electing a replacement as a result
of
intimidation
from Governor Riyadh’s brother, the tribal leader Mr Abu Hatim
(“Prince of
the
Marshes”).
1372
eGram
20021/05 Basra to FCO, 6 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit to Maysan
Province’.
1373
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 3.
1374
Report
Hurley, 9 July 2004, ‘Reporting to 5th July 04/Senior Police
Advisor [sic] Iraq (South)’. In May
2004, the
Police Chief of Majar al-Kabir was shot and killed (Fairweather
J, A War of
Choice: The British in
Iraq
2003‑9, Jonathan
Cape, 2011).
1375
Telegram 86
Basra to FCO, 24 July 2004, ‘Iraq: Visit to Maysan’.
1376
Telegram 90
Basra to FCO, 28 July 2004, ‘Iraq: Position of the Governor of
Maysan Province’.
1377
Telegram
141 Basra to FCO, 3 September 2004, ‘Maysan – Update’.
402