The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
217.
Discussing
whether it would be wise to go ahead with a vote without the
support
of Mexico
and Chile, and the different views within the US Administration,
Mr Straw told
Secretary
Powell that:
“… he was
clear that if we did not have nine votes we should go nowhere
near
the
Security Council. Even if we did have nine votes we should not go
if we knew
the French
would veto. Annan had signalled yesterday his unhappiness with
the
possibility
of the last act of the Security Council showing it divided and
fractured
… [H]e knew
that some people in the [US] Administration did not give a fig for
the
UN, but the
US and President Bush needed the UN across a range of subjects.
The
President
could make a better speech about the negotiating history of 1441
and
French
failure to insert a provision for a second resolution than about
why we were
ignoring a
Security Council veto.”
218.
Secretary
Powell asked that Mr Blair should make plain to President Bush
the UK’s
problems
with a failed second resolution.
219.
Mr Straw
said that in his opinion we would “need to adapt our strategy” and
that
the “Kosovo
model might be useful. In some ways our position was now stronger:
in
Kosovo we
had relied on customary international law, whereas here we had a
string of
resolutions
culminating in 1441”. Mr Straw stressed that was his opinion
and had not yet
been agreed
with Mr Blair.
220.
In a
conversation with Mr Blair that evening, President Lagos
confirmed he
was still
working on a draft resolution.
221.
When
Mr Blair and President Lagos spoke for a second time,
President Lagos
confirmed
that he was still working on a draft Mexican/Chilean
resolution.75
222.
In response to
a warning from Mr Blair that President Bush would not agree
a
deadline
“beyond 24 March”, President Lagos was reported to have commented
that
he would
put his preferred deadline in the draft and there could then be a
negotiation.
223.
In the
absence of nine votes for the resolution, Mr Straw and
Secretary
Powell
discussed not putting the resolution to a vote. They agreed the
decision
to pull
out of a vote could be explained by blaming France.
224.
Mr Straw
stated that in four successive meetings of the UN, no-one had
said
Iraq had
fully complied. “Iraq was therefore in material
breach.”
225.
When
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell spoke again at 9pm, Secretary
Powell stated
that the US
and UK had “just about convinced President Lagos and President Fox;
their
objections
were fading away.76
Mr Straw
said that President Lagos “seemed to be biting”.
75
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Chile, 11
March’.
76
Letter
Sinclair to Manning, 12 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with US Secretary
of State,
11 March’.
438