The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

423. In mid-February, officials expressed concern about two significant risks:

• the potential “nightmare scenario” of no second resolution and, at best,

only a weak legal basis for military action; and

• the continuing absence of a coherent plan for the administration of Iraq.

424. Over the previous year, Ministers, the military and officials had identified

effective preparation for the post-conflict phase as a requirement for strategic

success.

425. Mr Hoon had reminded Mr Blair as recently as 16 January that a satisfactory

post-conflict plan was needed before a decision was taken to deploy UK forces

(see Section 6.4).

426. As the extent of US opposition to a UN lead on civil administration became

clearer and the likely start date for military action approached, the Government

needed to reassess policy and prepare for the possibility that the US could not

be persuaded of the UK view.

427. No reassessment of UK policy took place.

428. Section 3.7 describes Mr Chaplin’s analysis of the prospects for a Ministerial-level

meeting of the Security Council on 14 February. On 13 February, he advised Mr Ricketts

that it was:

“… probably the last opportunity to reflect on whether we can extract … a better

outcome … than at present looks likely.

“… No SCR and a feeble, at best, legal basis for military action is a nightmare

scenario … A quick collapse of the Iraqi regime (quite likely); subsequent clear

proof, because we find the stuff, that we were right all along about the Iraqi WMD

threat (*questionable – what convinces the experts may not convince public opinion

unless it is pretty spectacular); and a smooth transfer to a democratic and stable

government (improbable, especially without UN cover) would reduce the damage.

But this is a high risk route.”197

429. On 14 February, officials advised No.10 of the critical importance of a

satisfactory post-conflict plan as part of an overall “winning concept” for Iraq.

430. A Cabinet Office paper on “winning the peace” gave a clear description of

the potential scale of the post-conflict task and the long list of issues still to be

resolved with the US.

197 Minute Chaplin to Ricketts, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The Endgame’.

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