The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
He
explained that Gen Casey had been briefed on the ideas in the
paper, but the text
had not
been shared with the US.
152.
Lt Gen McColl
advised that planning in Baghdad within the MNF-I had
highlighted
the need
for “coalition members to be clear about their desired national
end-states”
and there
were “indications that January 2006 could be the point at which the
desired
national
end-states of US and UK diverge”. He understood that the US was
considering
a
significant draw down over the next 15 months, from 17 brigades to
between three and
seven,
which was likely to result in a request for the UK to take control
of areas beyond
MND(SE) in
early 2005.
153.
The US
planning team considering the options for MNF-I distribution had
been
unaware of
the UK’s national commitments in 2006, which Lt Gen McColl
described
as “the
possible deployment of the ARRC [Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] and
the shift
of the
UK’s medium-scale commitment to Afghanistan”. That illustrated the
need to be
clear about
the UK’s strategic intentions.
154.
Lt Gen McColl
observed:
“Should the
UK decide that its national interests are best served by remaining
close
to US
policy on Iraq beyond January 2006, UK policy makers must be under
no
illusion as
to the nature of the growing insurgency, and the risks and
challenges that
any
long-term deployment of UK forces would present … The Iraqi
insurgency has
reached the
point where it is now capable of sustaining itself … for several
years
… Put
simply, the enemy is getting better … Evidence is increasingly
emerging …
that the
coalition’s presence is the single most important catalyst for this
… After the
elections
in January 2005 … the value of MNF-I’s continued presence is likely
to
come under
ever closer scrutiny. It will be important for the international
community
… to form a
judgement on this. However successful the elections … there will
be
a significant
insurgency for the foreseeable future.”
155.
A key factor
in assessing the need for extended MNF-I presence in Iraq
was
the degree
to which the ISF could operate without MNF-I support. Lt Gen
McColl
commented
that although there had been significant progress in developing the
ISF
there were
capability gaps and a “serious rift” between the Iraqi Ministries
of Defence
and
Interior. That would need to be addressed if the ISF was to assume
full responsibility
for Iraq’s
security without putting the country at serious risk.
156.
Lt Gen McColl
argued that it was important for the UK:
“… to
develop a national exit strategy. This is in no way inconsistent
with PM Blair’s
determination
to stay the course in Iraq. On the contrary, it places the onus on
the
UK defining
precisely what is meant by ‘the job is done’.
“Provided
the electoral process remains on schedule in 2005, there is much
to
commend a
withdrawal in early 2006. This is the natural political, legal and
(if we do
420