The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“the
increasing readiness of Iraqis to pursue their objectives through
politics instead
of violence”.
377.
The CIG judged
that Prime Minister Maliki viewed his coalition’s success
as
a personal
victory. It had increased his standing but his power to achieve
specific
objectives
would still vary with the issue. A successful challenge to his
position was
now unlikely
before national elections, expected in early 2010.
378.
The CIG
assessed that the election results represented an endorsement of
strong
central
government and a setback for federalism. It judged that Prime
Minister Maliki
would use
his success to push for greater centralisation.
379.
On 9 March,
the Assessments Staff issued a Current Assessment Note that
looked
at the
prospects for the ongoing reconciliation efforts between the Iraqi
Government and
the Sadrist
movement.152
It
said:
“Prime
Minister Maliki has sought reconciliation with the Sadrist movement
since he
launched
successful security operations against its Jaysh al-Mahdi militia
in 2008.
Progress
has been slow … but we judge that the prospects are now improving
…
“We assess
that Maliki’s relationship with the Sadrists is changing and that
the pace
of this
change is increasing. But achieving reconciliation and political
alliance will
take
months. The reconciliation process allows Maliki to control the
Sadrists without
needing to
give much in return. The Sadrists remain fragmented with no
clear
direction
or strategy, and have few levers.”
380.
Cabinet Office
officials provided Mr Brown with an update on Afghanistan and
Iraq
on 13
March.153
They
reported that levels of violence across Iraq were at a six-year
low,
a 90
percent decrease since the US surge began in 2007. Violence in
Basra remained
low, with
no UK or US casualties although a Pakistani civilian contractor had
been killed.
381.
UK military
mentors and trainers embedded with the Iraqi Army had begun
to
disengage,
and would have withdrawn completely by 31 March.
382.
Discussions on
an MOU for the UK’s “future (normal) military relationship with
Iraq”
had started
and should have concluded by the time of Prime Minister Maliki’s
visit for the
Investment
Conference.
383.
The Council of
Representatives had agreed the US$59bn Iraqi Budget, but
it
remained
US$16bn underfunded; 86 percent of the revenue would be from
oil.
384.
Gen Dannatt
paid what he expected to be his final visit to Iraq between 23
and
25 March,
and described the mood in the South as “rightly positive about what
has been
achieved
and optimistic about the future”.154
152
CIG Current
Assessment Note, 9 March 2009, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Reconciliation
with the Sadrists’.
153
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior officials] to Prime Minister, 13 March 2009,
‘Afghanistan and Iraq: Update’.
154
Minute CGS
to PS/SofS [MOD], 25 March 2008, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq – 23-25 Mar
09’.
446