5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
203.
Asked whether
his response to Mr Powell’s manuscript note on Lord
Goldsmith’s
draft
advice of 14 January was mostly about Lord Goldsmith understanding
the
negotiating
history, or whether he was keen to find an alternative that might
persuade
Lord
Goldsmith that there was a basis for military action, Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that
he thought
it was “both”.77
204.
Mr Blair
added that he thought Lord Goldsmith himself had suggested
meeting
Sir Jeremy:
“So in a
sense he had already raised that issue … I think I was simply
casting about
… I was
saying ‘Have a look at this point. Have a look at that’, but the
key thing was
indeed that
he was to speak to Jeremy.”
205.
Mr Brummell’s
record of Lord Goldsmith’s meeting with No.10 officials
on
19 December
records only that it would be “useful” for Lord Goldsmith to
“speak
to
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, to get a fuller picture of the history
of the negotiation
206.
Despite
Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice, Mr Blair continued to say in
public
that he
would not rule out military action if a further resolution in
response to an
Iraqi
breach was vetoed.
207.
He did so
in his statement to Parliament on 15 January and when he
gave
evidence to
the Liaison Committee on 21 January about taking action in the
event
of an
“unreasonable veto”.
208.
These
statements were at odds with the draft advice he had received
and
discussed
with Lord Goldsmith.
209.
During Prime
Minister’s Questions on 15 January, Mr Blair was asked a
series
of questions
by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Iain Duncan
Smith.79
210.
Asked whether
the Government’s position was that a second resolution
was
preferable
or, as Ms Clare Short, the Development Secretary, had said,
essential.
Mr Blair
replied:
“… we want
a UN resolution. I have set out continually, not least in the House
on
18 December
[2002], that in circumstances where there was a breach we went
back
to the UN
and the spirit of the UN resolution was broken because an
unreasonable
veto was
put down, we would not rule out action. That is the same position
that
everybody
has expressed, and I think it is the right position. However … it
is not
merely
preferable to have a second resolution. I believe that we will get
one.”
77
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 63.
78
Minute
Brummell, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq – Note of meeting at No.10
Downing Street,
19 December
2002’.
79
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 15
January 2003, columns 677-678.
43