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10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
202.  The US intended to put a senior US official and a small group of Iraqi exiles
into each ministry, having removed “undesirable elements”. US officials would work
as advisers to Iraqi ministries, which would be “headed by Iraqi secretaries-general”.
In practice, the advisers would oversee the work of the ministries and, in due course,
begin their reform and restructuring. The US understood the importance of calling those
officials “advisers”, rather than “shadow ministers”.
203.  The IPU reported that there was “a bitter inter-agency dispute in Washington”
over the list of US officials and Iraqi exiles. The UK had been invited to nominate British
advisers, but had made clear the need to be sure of the legal basis for their activities.
204.  Once the IIA had been established, there would be a phased transfer of
“the direction” of Iraqi ministries. The US intended that the Coalition Provisional
Administration should retain “considerable control” over the IIA’s handling of ministries.
The UK considered that to be “politically unsellable” and “unlawful”.
205.  The UK model for the IIA was based on the Supreme National Council for
Cambodia (the model proposed in the FCO paper ‘Models for Administering a Post-
Saddam Iraq’ in October 2002, see Section 6.4), which met regularly and took decisions
that would be implemented provided the UN Special Representative did not object.
206.  The IPU concluded:
“All the evidence suggests that the IIA will assert its independence vigorously from
the outset. A stately transfer of ministries’ powers from the Coalition to it may not be
politically possible. But a light supervisory role for a UN Special Co-ordinator may
be acceptable as the price the Iraqis have to pay for the international community’s
support to nation building. This might finally convince the US too.”
207.  The IPU paper on the UN Special Co-ordinator envisaged the appointee
co-ordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, exercising “a light degree
of supervision” over the IIA, and helping with preparations for the Central Iraq
Conference (a consultative conference that took place in Baghdad on 28 April,
described in Section 9.1).118 Direct UN administration of Iraq would cross “a red line
for the US and, probably, the Iraqis themselves”.
208.  The FCO Research Analysts’ paper on tribes, regions and governorates
described the role of Iraq’s tribes as “a question for the future”.119 Too much autonomy
and they could become a rival to the state. If they were ignored, “a potentially useful
counterweight to religious leaderships with political ambitions could be lost in the period
during which the new state will be forming”. Iraqi interlocutors maintained that, unlike in
Afghanistan, because much of the country was flat, it was “relatively easy for control to
be exercised over the whole country (the Kurdish mountains being the main exception)”.
118  Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 4 April 2003, ‘UN Special Co-ordinator’.
119  Paper Research Analysts, 4 April 2003, ‘Tribes, Regions and Governorates of Iraq’.
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