The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
There are
some security organisations, staffed with Tikritis and
Saddam’s
kinsmen and
with a record of oppression, which should have no further future
in
a
post‑S[addam] H[ussein] Iraq.
•
We need to
find out more about the civilian police and the
judiciary.
•
Ministers
will need to decide the level of engagement of the UK in SSR,
given
our limited
and stretched resources.”
24.
The paper was
tabled as a living document “open to comment and
improvement”
at the AHGI
meeting on 13 December.19
The AHGI
was told that “a Whitehall working
group on
SSR in Iraq has now been established and can undertake further
work”. The
SSR paper
was one of four that the FCO had handed to Mr Zalmay
Khalilzad, US
National
Security Council (NSC) Senior Director and Ambassador at Large to
the Iraqi
Opposition,
“in an attempt to shape US thinking”.
25.
The second
series of meetings between the UK, US and Australia to
discuss
post‑conflict
planning took place on 22 January 2003.20
In
preparation, the FCO Middle
East
Department drafted an “Annotated Agenda/overarching paper”. That
was submitted
to
Mr Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, for approval of the “general
line” that the UK
proposed to
take in discussion.
26.
On SSR, the
paper stated:
“Our
handling of the defeated Iraqi forces will be critical. We shall
need a DDR plan
for them,
consistent with our vision for the future of Iraq’s armed forces.
Experience
in Sierra
Leone and Afghanistan has shown that we need to ensure
consistency
between
first steps and a longer‑term vision on Security Sector Reform. As
well as
ensuring
the efficient use of our own resources, we shall want to find a way
to allow
partners to
join in SSR implementation. Does this work require new
impetus?”
27.
Mr Straw
approved the recommendations on 20 January. He reported
that
Mr Colin Powell,
US Secretary of State, had told him the US working assumption
was
that the US
and UK would be in Iraq for a long time after military
action.21
28.
The FCO paper
was also shared with the US and Australia.22
29.
On 16 January,
Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British
Embassy
Washington,
wrote to Mr Elliott Abrams, Senior Director for Near East and
North African
Affairs in
the US NSC, to propose a draft agenda for the talks, attaching a
copy of the
19
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
20
Minute
Chilcott to Chaplin and Private Secretary [FCO], 17 January 2003,
‘Iraq: Day‑after Issues’.
21
Minute
Private Secretary [FCO] to Chilcott, 20 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day‑After Issues’.
22
Letter
Brenton to Abrams, 16 January 2003, ‘US/UK/Australia Trilateral
Talks on Iraq: 22 January 2003’.
72