10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
by the UK
Deputy.380
TPUK would
consider the possibility of seconding individuals from
UK companies
to ORHA.
645.
The UK Deputy
reported her first impressions of ORHA(South) to
Mr Chilcott
on 1 June
(see Section 10.1).381
She advised
that Denmark was keen to capitalise
commercially
from its leading role in the South (although Ambassador Olsen was
at
pains to
distance himself from that effort). Many of the Danish staff in
ORHA(South)
were
sponsored by private companies. Although they had agreed not to
pursue
commercial
opportunities while working in ORHA, they were focusing their
attention
and expertise
in areas which might offer commercial opportunities. She concluded
that
“the Danish
model is an excellent one and something we should copy”. It
provided
ORHA with
the managers it needed, stimulated the local commercial sector, and
could
help UK
business.
646.
The UK Deputy
reported that she had re-tasked a UK secondee to
ORHA(South)
to “take on
the trade portfolio including, more surreptitiously, a watching UK
trade brief”.
647.
Mr Blair
visited Basra and Umm Qasr on 29 May. The visit prompted
Mr Blair to
direct
Whitehall to go back to a “war footing” to avoid “losing the peace
in Iraq”
(see
Section 10.1).
648.
On his return
from Iraq, Mr Blair sent a personal Note to President Bush
containing
specific
suggestions on how to accelerate progress in delivering visible
improvements
in Iraq,
including: “Bechtel needs to move far more quickly in letting
contracts for
infrastructure
reconstruction – patching up won’t do.”382
649.
Mr Blair
chaired a meeting on Iraq on 3 June attended by Mr Hoon,
Baroness
Amos (the
International Development Secretary), Sir Michael Jay (FCO
Permanent
Under
Secretary) and No.10 officials.383
Mr Blair
said he had returned from Iraq
convinced
that “an enormous amount needed to be done”, including
that:
•
Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and US decision-making processes
were
too slow:
contracts needed to be processed faster; and
•
UK
companies needed to be energised to take up opportunities in
Iraq.
650.
Following the
meeting, a No.10 official commissioned a number of
papers
for a
further meeting to be chaired by Mr Blair on 6 June. Those
included a list of
10‑15 outstanding
practical issues for Mr Blair to raise with President Bush
that would
“make
a big difference to the people of Iraq if they are
resolved”.
380
Email Allan
to Chatterton Dickson, 30 May 2003, ‘Basra Commercial
Opportunities’.
381
Minute UK
[junior official] to Chilcott, 1 June 2003, ‘ORHA South – First
Impressions’.
382
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Note’
attaching ‘Note’.
383
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting, 3
June’.
471