The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
investigation of crimes by the former Iraqi regime;
and
•
managing
expectations on WMD in anticipation of “thin pickings” in the
Iraq
Survey
Group’s report (see Section 4.4).
320.
Sir Nigel
recommended a “beginning-of-term talk to President Bush” and a
meeting
with the
key players in London ahead of it.
321.
Mr Blair
wrote on Sir Nigel’s minute:
“This isn’t
really working at present. I will have to reflect on how we
progress …
I need
a meeting next week.”
322.
After the UN
bombing in mid-August, a “follow-on review” took
place.194
Its conclusions
were sent to senior military figures and copied to Sir Nigel
Sheinwald
and others
on 1 September. It listed the following as key
requirements:
“a. Surge
forces amounting to around a battalion between now and late Nov
to
support
current operations and to offer protection to the CPA;
and
b. Enduring
requirement to increase force protection, commence ICDC
[Iraqi
Civil
Defence Corps] training and to improve the ISTAR capability in
MND(SE)
amounting
to around a battalion …”
323.
There were
reports from MND(SE) of former regime loyalists returning
to
southern
Iraq; they and terrorist groups (such as Ansar al-Islam and Al
Qaida) were
expected to
operate in southern Iraq and to carry out terrorist attacks there
“for the
324.
The meeting
Mr Blair requested in his note to Sir Nigel Sheinwald was held
on 2
September.196
It was
attended by Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Mr Hilary Benn
(Minister of State
for
Development), Gen Walker, Sir Richard Dearlove (C), Mr John
Scarlett (Chairman
of the
JIC), Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Mr Sawers (FCO Director General
Political)197
and
No.10
officials.
325.
A brief for
the meeting provided to Mr Hoon’s Assistant Private Secretary
by the
MOD
Assistant Director, Iraq said that Mr Straw was “likely to
argue that what is needed
is …
reinforcement of UK forces with a Brigade” and that, at the
meeting, Gen Walker
would “lead
on whether this is possible and in what
timescales”.198
194
Minute
SECCOS to [Chiefs of Staff], 1 September 2003, ‘Op Cos Paper: Op
TELIC – UK Force and
Resources
Review an Update’ attaching Paper DCJO(Ops), 2 September 2003, ‘Op
Telic – UK Force and
Resources
Review – an Update’.
195
Paper HQ
MND(SE) [junior officer], 1 September 2003, ‘HQ MND(SE) Forces and
Resources Review’.
196
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime
Minister’.
197
The title
of this post changed from Political Director to Director General
Political. It is the role previously
held by
Mr Peter Ricketts.
198
Minute AD
Iraq to APS/SofS [MOD], 2 September 2003, ‘Post-Najaf; Meeting with
the Prime Minister’.
262