The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
710.
At the end of
January 2004, a Force Level Review by Lt Gen Reith
recommended
that:
“Significant
manpower savings may be possible through a rationalisation of
security
and
that:
“Given the
right conditions there will be no need to replace the SSR battalion
… and
the surge
battalion … in Jul 04 … The intent is progressively and prudently
to reduce
the
Division’s footprint so that, by Jul 04, the Iraqi Security Forces
are well placed
to assume
their part in Regional Control. This draw down of UK forces will
continue
until the
major roulement in Nov 04.”
711.
Those
recommendations were based on an assumption that Security
Sector
Reform
would be implemented “largely as planned (but only to applicable
standards
for Iraq)”.
712.
The basis for
a continued military presence in Iraq post-handover
remained
unresolved.
713.
Gen Jackson
had returned from his visit “surprised at just how immature
the
plans for
transition of authority on 1st July 2004 remain” and had concluded
that “any
partnership
between the Coalition and the ITA [Iraqi Transitional
Administration] should,
in effect,
make Iraq ‘part of the Coalition’”.389
714.
The Iraq
Senior Officials Group, chaired by Mr Bowen, discussed the
Security
Agreement
on 28 January. By this time “UK non-papers on the Security
Agreement and
post-transition
security architecture had been fed into the US
system”.390
715.
The US
position was uncertain, but it was believed that US officials were
likely to
recommend a
“high degree of Coalition military control post-transition” which
“did not sit
well with
our desire for prominent Iraqi security leadership after 1
July”.
716.
In early
February, a draft of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was
leaked
and
published in full by a Kuwaiti newspaper.391
It
contained language which implied that
the
transitional government would have control over all security forces
in Iraq, including
those
belonging to the Coalition.
388
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 29 January 2004, ‘Op TELIC Force Level Review –
Jan 04’.
389
Minute CGS
to CDS, 21 January 2004, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC 15-18 Jan
04’.
390
Letter Dodd
to Buck, 28 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials
Group’.
391
Letter
Manning to Sheinwald, 4 February 2004, ‘Iraq Meeting with
Blackwill, NSC: 4 February’.
324