The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In a
telephone call to Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of
Defense, on 11 March
about the
timing of military action, Mr Hoon emphasised the importance
of a few extra
days to win
over Chile and Mexico and the domestic politics in the
UK.55
The MOD
reported that Secretary Rumsfeld had said Gen Franks was looking at
how
to “work
around” a position in which the UK could not participate in
military action
which
assumed that the UK would be available for post-conflict
activities. Mr Hoon had
responded
that the UK would not want to be in that position and reiterated
the case for
waiting a
few more days.
In a
subsequent press briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld said that it was
unclear what the UK
role would
be in the event that a decision was made to use force:
“… until we
know what the resolution is, we won’t know the answer to what their
role
Secretary
Rumsfeld subsequently clarified his comments, saying he had “no
doubt of
the full
support of the United Kingdom for the international community’s
efforts to disarm
Iraq”.57
Obtaining a
second resolution was important to the UK, and the US was
“working
to achieve
that”. He added:
“In the
event that a decision to use force is made, we have every reason to
believe
that there
will be a significant military contribution from the United
Kingdom.”
In his
memoir Mr Blair wrote that Secretary Rumsfeld had been “trying
to be helpful”, but
it had not
helped and “by then the military were absolutely determined,
rightly, that they
would be
part of the action from the outset, and took amiss any sense that
we might be
In the
entry for 11 March in the edition of his diaries published in 2012,
Mr Campbell wrote
that the
incident was “indicative of the difficulties” of working with the
US.59
Secretary
Rumsfeld’s
clarification was the result of a further telephone call from
Mr Hoon “making it
clear that
we were with them”.
174.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw met early on 11 March to take stock and agree a
plan
to make
telephone calls lobbying contacts for support for the UK
approach.60
175.
President
Putin told Mr Blair that there were grounds for believing
that
Saddam
Hussein understood the need for disarmament and had opted
for
55
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Call to Donald
Rumsfeld’.
56
US
Department of Defense, 11 March 2003, DoD News
Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers.
57
BBC
News, 12 March
2003, Text of
Donald Rumsfeld remarks.
58
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
59
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
60
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Gameplan for 11
March’.
432