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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
413.  The report stated that the SIS source had commented that:
“Saddam Hussein was determined to maintain his CBW capability. If the major
production centres near Baghdad were attacked and damaged, the regime
would order staff to relocate to an alternative undamaged site.”
Iraq “was concentrating its efforts on the production of anthrax and that Iraq had
received a lot of help from neighbouring and friendly countries”.
The action was “in preparation for the admission of weapons inspectors”.
“New accommodation for senior scientists and their colleagues was being built
near to the major BW and CW production sites. The families of those scientists
would, in effect, be held hostage. They would be discouraged from deserting or
from leaking information about activities at their facilities that might lead to the
sites being targeted for bombing by allied forces.”
414.  An SIS comment informed readers that:
Chlorine was “one of the base chemicals for the production of CW agents such
as mustard and the nerve agent sarin”.
Chlorine was also used in the production of uranium trichloride “which in turn
may be used as a feed material for the electromagnetic isotope separation
process (EMIS) to enrich uranium for weapons production”. Iraq had previously
admitted, in its declarations to UNSCOM, “attempting to pursue this route to
produce weapon grade highly enriched uranium” before 1991; and, “Although
Iraq encountered problems in scaling up the production capability, it had
succeeded in producing a small quantity of lower enrichments and was
continuing to resolve the problems before the EMIS programme was halted
by Coalition air strikes.”
415.  The report was described as “high impact” and the source was described as:
“A new source on trial with direct access.” SIS advised that readers would “receive
relevant briefing as soon as can be arranged”.
416.  The report was sent to Mr Simon McDonald (Mr Straw’s Principal Private
Secretary), Sir Michael Jay, Mr Wright, Mr Chaplin, Mr Ehrman, Sir David Manning,
Mr Scarlett, Mr Bowen, Mr Miller, Mr Peter Watkins (Mr Hoon’s Principal Private
Secretary), Sir Kevin Tebbit (MOD Permanent Under Secretary) and Mr Webb.
417.  It was not sent to Sir David Omand, AM French, Mr Tony Cragg, MOD Deputy
Chief of Defence Intelligence (DCDI), or the Heads of GCHQ or MI5.
418.  Documents seen by the Inquiry state that the distribution was approved personally
by Sir Richard Dearlove.
192
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