The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

626.  Mr Davies stated that two regiments of police were being formed from soldiers

who were “simply changing the colour of their shirts” to form assault brigades. He also

said: “The poor quality of leadership is being buttressed by Generals with a military

background being transferred to the police.”

627.  Mr Davies suggested that the UK could offer further assistance through:

• developing a professional facility to deal with kidnapping and hostage taking;

• continued support for “operational planning training”;

• doubling UK advisers to bolster support to senior IPS officers and cover other

UK officers’ leave periods; and

• supporting the development of the IPS intelligence strategy.

628.  Following Mr Davies’ report, Mr Straw requested advice from the IPU.565 A junior

official responded on 5 November, indicating that Mr Davies was in “daily contact” with

the IPU on policing in Iraq and that the emphasis was “now on quality not quantity”. The

two most significant problems were identified as “the dysfunctional MOI and equipment

shortages” and IPU highlighted the two recent GCPP funded initiatives to address those

(see Box, ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool strategy update’, earlier in this Section).

629.  In November, DCC Brand produced a report highlighting a range of issues from his

time in Baghdad and recommendations to address them.566 Those included that:

• police involvement in pre‑conflict planning could have helped to ensure the IPS

were better prepared for their new role;

• the FCO providing terms of reference for seconded senior police officers would

help to manage expectations for each mission; and

• a “fundamental shift should occur in HMG’s [Her Majesty’s Government’s] policy

on the raising of police officers to support international missions” to create a

standing reserve of officers that are able to be deployed quickly.

630.  In his conclusion, DCC Brand observed that many of his suggestions echoed

earlier reports (including the Brahimi Report567) whose recommendations had been

“largely ignored”. He commented that he had “called this report ‘lessons identified’, as

only time will tell whether any lessons have been learned”.

631.  The Inquiry has seen no acknowledgement of or response to DCC Brand’s report

by the Government.

565  Minute IPU [junior official] to PS [FCO], 5 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Advice to FS Following Robert Davies

Paper on IPS’.

566  Report Brand, November 2004, ‘Iraq 2003‑2004 Domestic Lessons Identified for Police Deployments’.

567  UN Report, 21 August 2000, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’.

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