3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
Middle East
climate, we would probably be faced with the collapse of sanctions
and
the
effective end of our containment policy.”32
96.
Addressing the
“Legal position/UN route”, Mr Goulty wrote:
“Whether we
participated or not, we would wish to see a convincing legal
justification
for
military action …”
97.
Addressing the
chances of obtaining fresh UN authority, Mr Goulty advised that
it
seemed:
“… highly
unlikely that, in the absence of a new attack on Kuwait or the
Kurds or of
clear and
publicly usable evidence that Iraq has reconstituted its WMD, the
Security
Council
would agree a further resolution that could justify military
action. This
would
include a new … resolution specifically demanding access for the
weapons
inspectors,
although we should still push for one … We should continue to
put
pressure on
Iraq to readmit inspectors – this makes sense whether or not
military
action is
contemplated. If the Iraqi regime continues to refuse (and signs
are … it
has no
intention of doing otherwise) we would at least be in a stronger
position to
defend
military action. In the unlikely event that the inspectors are
admitted, history
would
suggest that it would not be long before they were blocked, which
again would
strengthen
the arguments for military action. We should also continue pushing
for
tougher
action … against those states … breaking sanctions (especially
Syria).
Again this
makes sense whether or not military action is contemplated: it
would put
real
pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to
lash out.”
“Our
message to those who oppose military action should be to get
serious about
the UN
route: encouraging Iraq to believe that it can escape sanctions
without
complying
with SCRs, seeking to water down those … obligations, and
blocking
initiatives
in the UN to crack down on smuggling serves only to make military
action
more
likely.”
99.
Mr Goulty’s
view was that: “In the current climate, and in the absence of
progress
on the MEPP
– highly unlikely in this timescale – Arab States would have the
greatest
difficulties
in supporting an operation which is bound to be seen as serving
Israeli
interests.”
Nevertheless there were signs that some countries would support the
US.
The UK
would have “a better picture of regional attitudes after Vice
President Cheney’s
March
tour”.
100.
Addressing the
attitudes of others, Mr Goulty wrote:
“We would
expect the Iranians, hitherto (privately) in favour of action to
remove
Saddam
Hussein, to be much less helpful in the light of President Bush’s
‘axis
32
Minute
Goulty to Fry, 20 February 2002, ‘Military action against Iraq:
Issues’.
403