6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
as a work
in progress, subject to the inclusion of an explicit reference to
DFID’s lack of
financial
resources to cover the humanitarian contingencies considered in the
paper.367
733.
The substance
of the paper was little changed from October, but a new
introduction
made
explicit reference to the need to consider the humanitarian
consequences not just
of military
action, but also of regime change without major military action and
of Iraqi
compliance
with UN resolutions.368
The paper
stated:
“Most
humanitarian planning is currently focused on the after-effects of
conflict …
But UK
ministers are clear that humanitarian planning should also consider
other
contingencies
and not assume conflict is the most likely, in line with current
UK
policy
objectives for Iraq which focus on disarmament rather than conflict
or regime
change.”
734.
The paper also
stated that DFID had begun informal contacts with UN
agencies
and that
wider contacts might follow the passage of a resolution, a UN
decision to start
more active
planning, or further UK Ministerial guidance.
735.
Ms Short told
the Inquiry that she had spoken to Mr Kofi Annan, the UN
Secretary-
General,
and Ms Louise Fréchette, UN Deputy Secretary-General, a number of
times,
“sort of
slightly breaching the No.10 ruling”.369
She
believed that Mr Chakrabarti had
also done
so. It was “very fraught” for the UN because of divisions within
the Security
Council:
“The UN prepared, but kept it quiet.”
736.
There is no
indication that temporary restrictions on DFID’s contacts
with
the UN and
the US had a lasting impact on UK planning for post-conflict
Iraq.
The Inquiry
does not accept, however, that the political sensitivity of the
UK
being seen
to prepare for conflict while pursuing a negotiated solution to the
Iraq
crisis
should have interfered with discreet contingency planning for the
possible
consequences
of military action. It was necessary at all stages to consider
and
prepare for
the worst.
737.
At Ms Short’s
meeting with officials on 21 October, Mr Fernie reported that
the
FCO was not
considering the possible humanitarian consequences of the use of
WMD.
Ms Short
identified that as an area of legitimate focus for DFID and
commissioned a
paper for
Mr Blair, to be produced, if possible, before 30
October.370
738.
On 29 October,
OD Sec wrote to Mr Robert Lowson, DEFRA Director for
Environmental
Protection Strategy, about oil-related environmental
contingency
planning.
The letter also asked whether there was “any official UK capacity,
beyond
that of the
MOD, to assist with CBW clear-up or in providing clean water in
these
367
Manuscript
comment Short, 4 November 2002, on Minute Fernie to Private
Secretary/Secretary of
State
[DFID], 4 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning: Humanitarian
Paper’.
368
Paper UK
Department for International Development, 5 November 2002, ‘Iraq:
Potential Humanitarian
Implications’.
369
Public
hearing, 2 February 2010, page 52.
370
Minute
Bewes to Fernie, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
235