3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Saddam’s
own capability to conduct terrorist attacks is limited,
especially
outside the
Middle East. But the threat of terrorism conducted or directed
by
Iraqi
Intelligence, including the use of chemical or biological material,
cannot
be discounted.
•
In the
event of imminent regime collapse, Iraqi chemical and biological
material
could be
transferred to terrorists including Al Qaida, whether or not as
deliberate
regime
policy.
•
Al Qaida
and associated networks will remain the greatest terrorist threat
to the
UK. The
risk of attacks will increase following any Coalition attack on
Iraq.
•
Hizballah’s
terrorist wing will not conduct attacks in support of Saddam.
But
it may
attack US forces in Iraq following a campaign, if it judges that
the US
intends to
act against Hizballah, Syria or Iran. […] Individual
Palestinian
terrorists
may attack Western interests, without sanction from parent
groups.”
180.
Other key
elements from the Assessment are set out in the Box
below.
Al Qaida
and other Islamist terrorists
•
There was
“continuing determination by Al Qaida and other Islamist
terrorists
to attack
Western interests around the globe”.
•
The JIC had
“previously judged that Al Qaida and other Islamist terrorists
may
initiate
attacks in response to Coalition military action against Iraq, and
that Al
Qaida will
use an attack on Iraq as further justification for terrorist
attacks in the
West and
Israel”.
•
Some reports
indicated that Usama Bin Laden had “instructed that there
should
be no
terrorist attacks before the start of a conflict”.
•
Al Qaida
intended “to exploit both anti-Western sentiment within the Muslim
world,
and the
preoccupation of the US and UK that would come from action against
Iraq”.
•
Al Qaida or
associated groups might “also seek to conduct attacks against
Israel,
intended to
provoke a reaction that would further inflame feeling within the
Islamic
world”.
•
The JIC
believed that Islamist terrorists had manufactured and
stockpiled
chemical
and biological (CB) material intended for attacks against both
UK
and US
targets in the Gulf, and that: “Instructions for production of
similar CB
materials”
had been “distributed by Gulf-based terrorists to
extremists”.
•
The JIC had
“some doubts
about the viability of the proposed attack
methods”, but
judged there was “a serious
intention to use CB weapons”.
•
“Even if
successful, individual attacks might inflict relatively few
casualties.
But attacks
could be numerous and cause significant alarm.”
•
The use of CB
materials was “an increasing aspiration of Islamic
extremists
globally,
including in Europe”.
•
“Such material
may be manufactured locally or provided by production
facilities
such as
that operating in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) in Northern
Iraq.”
213