9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
341.
The JIC
assessed that:
“… many
Mujahedin, willing to accept martyrdom, have come to Iraq since the
war
… Most are
probably not affiliated or connected with specific terrorist groups
…
It appears
that the networks see Iraq as the new focus for Jihad … We do not
know
how many
Mujahedin there are within Iraq, or how integrated they are
…
“The main
organised Islamic terrorist group in Iraq is Ansar al-Islam (AI),
which is
closely
associated with Al Qaida (AQ). The group suffered significant
casualties in
Coalition
attacks, but about 450 members escaped … AI has since
reorganised,
with some
assistance from elements of the Iranian regime, and its members are
now
present in
at least northern and central Iraq, with large quantities of
weapons … and
explosives.
Intelligence suggests Islamic extremists and possibly AI are also
trying
to
establish themselves in southern Iraq, though with what success is
uncertain.
It seems
that AI is becoming an important co-ordinator for Islamic
volunteers from
across the
Arab world, possibly reflecting an ambition to become a
significant
international
actor.”
342.
The Assessment
continued:
“…
Mujahedin groups and AI have conducted some of the low-level
attacks on
Coalition
Forces, but we cannot specify how many or which ones …
“Bin Laden
has called on Muslims to fight the Coalition and encouraged
extremists
to travel
to Iraq. al-Zarqawi, closely associated with AI and AQ was reported
before
the war to
be establishing cells that would conduct attacks in the event of a
Coalition
Occupation.
Terrorists associated with al-Zarqawi probably remain in
Iraq.
“Islamic
extremists/terrorists can draw on external recruits and finance. We
judge
that they
are likely to present the main long-term threat to Coalition
interests in Iraq.”
343.
The JIC also
judged that:
“Attacks by
Iraqi Shia groups have been limited to date … reporting
indicated
supporters
of militant Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are acquiring weapons,
planning
attacks on
Coalition targets and may have already attacked Iraqi
officials.”
344.
The JIC
characterised Shia consent as “fragile and eroding” and judged
that
any attempt
to disarm Shia militia groups such as al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army “could
be a
significant
additional cause of friction”. The JIC assessed that:
“Hitherto,
the general tenor of Shia clerical advice has been to give the
Coalition
a year in
which to make a difference. But the recent attacks are likely to
have
shortened
this timeline substantially. If the acquiescence of senior clerics
and others
with
influence … changes to hostility, it would have the most serious
consequences
for the
security situation in southern Iraq.”
265