3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
“TB said we
had reached the point of decision for people. We had been
there
before but
there really had to be a decision. How many times could there
be
a last
chance, serious consequences for material breach? He reported
that
Kofi
[Annan] had said the French and Russians would not rule out force
but
would not
agree to an ultimatum, which was an odd position. He really hit
the
UN buttons
post-Saddam, and was trying to force Bush to go further on
that.
‘It has to
be a UN-authorised government.’ He was also hammering home
the
advantages
on MEPP, but I wasn’t convinced it would happen.”
•
“We needed
some kind of process story so I suggested to TB they all
instruct
their
ambassadors at the UN to have one last go, see if the position of
the others
had
changed.”
•
“TB was
constantly emphasising final appeal, final
opportunity.”
•
“Bush was
scathing re the Turks … He was pretty keen to get on with
things
now, wanted
to pull down the SCR now. He then said he would address
the
American
people tomorrow – say diplomacy had failed, issue the
ultimatum.
He said to
TB we should say we were issuing one last set of instructions to
UN
ambassadors
to have a go at securing agreement.”
•
“Aznar was
really pushing the importance of the transatlantic alliance, but
he
was in even
more political hot water on this than we were.”235
687.
The ‘Vision
for Iraq and the Iraqi People’, issued at the Summit, and outlining
the
challenge
Saddam Hussein posed to the world, stated:
•
“Iraq’s
talented people, rich culture, and tremendous potential had
been
hijacked by
Saddam Hussein”, whose “brutal regime had reduced” Iraq “to
an
international
pariah” that oppressed “its citizens, started two wars of
aggression
against its
neighbours” and still posed “a grave threat to the security of
the
region and
the world”.
•
“Saddam’s
defiance” of Security Council resolutions demanding
disarmament
had
“undermined the authority of the UN”. The international community
had
“tried to
persuade him to disarm and thereby avoid military conflict, most
recently
through the
unanimous adoption of resolution 1441”. If he refused “even now
to
co-operate
fully” with the UN, he brought “on himself the serious
consequences
foreseen in
resolution 1441 and previous resolutions”.
•
“In these
circumstances, we would undertake a solemn obligation to help
the
Iraqi
people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours.
The Iraqi
people
deserve to be lifted from insecurity and tyranny, and freed to
determine
for
themselves the future of their country. We envisage a unified Iraq
with its
territorial
integrity respected. All the Iraqi people – its rich mix … should
enjoy
freedom,
prosperity, and equality in a united country. We will support the
Iraqi
235
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
519