The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
304.
The FCO
concluded: “The first step must be to share our thinking with the
US”
before
addressing the approach to the other Permanent Members of the
Security
Council.
In response
to hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern
No‑Fly Zone,
US
aircraft, with UK aircraft in support, attacked an Iraqi air
defence facility in western Iraq
on 5
September 2002, prompting press speculation that it was a prelude
to Special Forces
attacks and
more general military action.99
Mr Amre
Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League, told a press
conference in
Cairo on 5
September that any attack would cause major instability in the
region.100
The
press also
reported Arab foreign ministers had said that military action to
topple Saddam
Hussein
would “open the gates of hell” and that no Arab countries would
join it.
305.
Mr Straw
had a different perspective. He advised that the UK should seek
a
resolution
that simply determined that Iraq’s failure to co‑operate
constituted a
breach of
its obligations and set an ultimatum for the readmission of
inspectors
on the
basis of the provisions in resolution 1284.
306.
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary wrote to No.10 on 6 September offering
“elements”
for a
possible resolution “authorising a tougher mandate and enforcement
powers for
UNMOVIC
inspectors in Iraq” and a draft resolution taking a different
approach.101
307.
The first
draft resolution made clear that “Iraq would be obliged to grant
inspectors
immediate
access to any sites, records or officials as requested”; with the
“provision of
armed
guards to accompany UNMOVIC” and authorisation for “a standby force
to assist
UNMOVIC
obtain Iraqi compliance if necessary”. The FCO stated that it had
assumed
military
operations would be run by a “coalition of the willing led by the
US”, not run
by the
UN.
308.
The FCO
advised that there would be “strong pressure” from members of
the
Security
Council “to be consulted again before military action” commenced.
The draft
aimed
“high” by “including various formulae designed to obtain prior UNSC
authority
or at
least approval in principle, for any enforcement
action”.
309.
The timetable
in the draft resolution was “modelled on the arrangements
envisaged
in UNSCR
1284 [1999]”, which the FCO commented were “likely to be considered
too
99
Daily
Telegraph, 6
September 2002, 100 jets
join attack on Iraq.
100
BBC
News, 6
September 2002, Iraqi air
defence site attacked.
101
Letter
Davies to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Draft
Elements for a UNSCR
on UNMOVIC’.
148