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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
304.  The FCO concluded: “The first step must be to share our thinking with the US”
before addressing the approach to the other Permanent Members of the Security
Council.
Attack in Iraq, 5 September
In response to hostile acts against coalition aircraft monitoring the southern No‑Fly Zone,
US aircraft, with UK aircraft in support, attacked an Iraqi air defence facility in western Iraq
on 5 September 2002, prompting press speculation that it was a prelude to Special Forces
attacks and more general military action.99
Mr Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League, told a press conference in
Cairo on 5 September that any attack would cause major instability in the region.100 The
press also reported Arab foreign ministers had said that military action to topple Saddam
Hussein would “open the gates of hell” and that no Arab countries would join it.
FCO advice, 6 September 2002
305.  Mr Straw had a different perspective. He advised that the UK should seek a
resolution that simply determined that Iraq’s failure to co‑operate constituted a
breach of its obligations and set an ultimatum for the readmission of inspectors
on the basis of the provisions in resolution 1284.
306.  Mr Straw’s Private Secretary wrote to No.10 on 6 September offering “elements”
for a possible resolution “authorising a tougher mandate and enforcement powers for
UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq” and a draft resolution taking a different approach.101
307.  The first draft resolution made clear that “Iraq would be obliged to grant inspectors
immediate access to any sites, records or officials as requested”; with the “provision of
armed guards to accompany UNMOVIC” and authorisation for “a standby force to assist
UNMOVIC obtain Iraqi compliance if necessary”. The FCO stated that it had assumed
military operations would be run by a “coalition of the willing led by the US”, not run
by the UN.
308.  The FCO advised that there would be “strong pressure” from members of the
Security Council “to be consulted again before military action” commenced. The draft
aimed “high” by “including various formulae designed to obtain prior UNSC authority
or at least approval in principle, for any enforcement action”.
309.  The timetable in the draft resolution was “modelled on the arrangements envisaged
in UNSCR 1284 [1999]”, which the FCO commented were “likely to be considered too
99 Daily Telegraph, 6 September 2002, 100 jets join attack on Iraq.
100 BBC News, 6 September 2002, Iraqi air defence site attacked.
101 Letter Davies to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Draft Elements for a UNSCR
on UNMOVIC’.
148
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