The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
562.
The Executive
Summary of the Iraq dossier stated that, in addition to the
public
evidence on
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the
Government
had
“significant additional information … from secret intelligence
sources” which,
although it
could not “tell us about everything”, provided “a fuller picture of
Iraqi plans
563.
In the chapter
on the role of intelligence, the dossier stated that intelligence
had
“provided
important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military
thinking”, and that:
“Taken
together with what is already known from other sources, this
intelligence
builds our
understanding of Iraq’s capabilities and adds significantly to the
analysis
in the
public domain.”
564.
The dossier
stated that the chapter on the current position set out “what we
know
of Saddam
Hussein’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes,
drawing on
all the available evidence”.296
It drew
“heavily on the latest intelligence about
Iraqi
efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998” to
support a list
of “main
conclusions”,
including that Saddam Hussein continued:
“… to
attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass
destruction
and
ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq’s
regional power.
He is
determined to retain these capabilities …”
565.
The dossier
stated that, by 1991, Iraq had produced more than 16,000
free-fall
bombs and
more than 110,000 artillery rockets and shells for the delivery of
chemical
and
biological agents.297
It had also
admitted to having 50 chemical and 25 biological
warheads
available for ballistic missiles.
566.
UNSCOM had
destroyed 30 of the warheads filled with chemical
agents.298
It
had
also
destroyed chemical munitions, agent and precursors and biological
seed stocks and
growth
media, and dismantled or destroyed chemical and biological
production facilities.
567.
The dossier
challenged Iraq’s claims that chemical agents produced before
1991
would have
deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless and that it had
destroyed
all its
biological weapons and agent.299
295
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
5.
296
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
17.
297
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
15.
298
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
40.
299
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
19.
220