6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
371.
In his advice
to Mr Straw, Mr Chaplin had argued against avoiding all
mention of
regime
change:
“It seems
to me unrealistic to expect that the Americans will sign up to a
common
set of
campaign objectives which does not include explicit mention of
regime change
(put in the
context of disarmament), especially once military action has begun.
At
that point
it would be very difficult to claim publicly that, although we were
taking part
in military
action, we did not intend or expect the regime to
fall.”174
372.
Mr O’Brien
had proposed specific wording to Mr Straw that “should satisfy
the
Americans
but stop short of making regime change an explicit element of UK
objectives”
by
establishing more clearly that regime change was needed to secure
long-term
disarmament:
“The UK’s
overall objective for the military campaign is to create the
conditions in
which Iraq
disarms in accordance with its obligations under UNSCRs [UN
Security
Council
resolutions] and creates the circumstances in which Iraq remains
disarmed
373.
Mr Straw
included that proposal in a letter to Mr Blair on 11 February,
in which he
expressed
“serious concerns” about the presentation of military campaign
objectives:
“It is
particularly important to explain carefully any reference to regime
change. We
must
underline that this is only necessary because Iraq has consistently
refused
to comply
with UN Security Council resolutions. Otherwise people here and in
the
region will
assume that we had been intent on regime change all
along.”176
374.
The MOD
comments on the draft objectives had focused on whether they
provided
“enough top
cover to derive appropriate CDS and targeting directives to enable
us to
work in
coalition with the US”.177
375.
DFID had
proposed the addition of references to:
•
addressing,
rather than minimising, any adverse humanitarian consequences
of
the
military campaign;
•
demonstrating
to the Iraqi people, rather than reassuring them, that their
security
and
well-being was the UK’s concern; and
•
ensuring
that sanctions were lifted and that the OFF programme and
resources
were
available to meet the needs of the Iraqi people.178
174
Minute
Chaplin to PS [FCO], 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
175
Minute [FCO
junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003,
‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
176
Letter
Straw to Prime Minister, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’ attaching
Paper [unattributed],
‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.
177
Letter Lee
to Bowen, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
178
Letter
Brewer to Bowen, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
373