The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

co-operation with the various other [FCO] geographical and functional departments

engaged in crisis related work … and Press Office. It will also work closely with the

Iraq Planning Unit which, for the moment, continues to lead on the less immediate,

longer-term, post-conflict planning issues.”

Mr Ricketts had been chairing regular FCO morning and evening meetings on Iraq since

late 2002 (see Section 6.4). The last of those meetings took place on the morning of 14

March.397

After the closure of the Emergency Unit on 2 May, Mr Ricketts resumed daily Iraq policy

meetings in his office from 6 May.398

On 20 March, Sir Michael Jay informed Mr Straw that almost 5 percent of FCO staff in

London had been redeployed to work on Iraq, including 170 volunteers to temporary

positions in the two emergency units.399

That number far exceeded the combined total of appointments to the IPU, to the new

Embassy in Baghdad and to ORHA (see Section 15.1).

940. On 13 March, Mr Blair told Cabinet that President Bush had promised a UN

mandate for reconstruction.

941. Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on the afternoon of 12 March (see Section 3.8).400

Among the issues discussed was a US statement on the need for a further UN resolution

on post-conflict Iraq.

942. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a second

resolution (see Section 3.8).401 He also stated that “the reconstruction of Iraq after a

conflict would need a United Nations Security Council resolution”. The US had “now

agreed” to that.

943. In the discussion, points made included that UN authority for the reconstruction of

Iraq was “essential so that all countries and international institutions could contribute”.

944. In her memoir, Ms Short wrote that, after Cabinet on 13 March, Mr Blair told her

that President Bush had “promised [a] UN mandate for reconstruction”.402

397 Minute Kernahan to PS/PUS, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting’.

398 Minutes, 1 May 2003, FCO Emergency Unit Iraq Meeting.

399 Minute Jay to Secretary of State [FCO], 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq Contingency Planning and Prioritisation’.

400 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation with

President Bush, 12 March’.

401 Cabinet Conclusions, 13 March 2003.

402 Short C. An Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power. The Free Press, 2004.

482