10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
114.
Mr Quarrey
passed the Cabinet Office’s paper on reconstruction in Najaf and
other
key cities
and the DFID paper on how to accelerate reconstruction on the
ground in the
wake of the
Tokyo Donor Conference to Mr Blair on 22
October.61
115.
The Cabinet
Office paper concluded that “the general impression is that, as
yet,
there is no
systematic or co-ordinated approach to these key
cities”.62
It
identified a
number of
lessons, including:
•
It was
possible for political deals to hold long enough for the IIG/PCO
to
deliver
enough reconstruction to start building public support and
discredit the
insurgents.
•
There
needed to be a sufficient continuing ISF presence for the IIG to
remain
in control
and to facilitate reconstruction.
•
IIG and to
some extent PCO capacity to deliver reconstruction quickly was
very
limited.
CERPs delivered impact most quickly.
116.
The DFID paper
on the follow-up to the Tokyo donors meeting advised that
while
the
procedural obstacles to spending US and Trust Fund allocations had
largely been
overcome,
the security situation was worse.63
To “get
round” that problem, there was
now a
greater emphasis on using Iraqi systems and contractors. In that
context, to
accelerate
the pace of reconstruction, the UK needed to:
•
Persuade
the World Bank and UN at the top level to move fast, and to
send
development
specialists to Iraq. Mr Benn had lobbied the UN
Secretary-General
Kofi Annan
on 19 October.
•
Provide
funding and security for World Bank and UN liaison staff. DFID
funded
and housed
one liaison officer for each of the World Bank and UN in
Baghdad,
and was
considering funding a UN liaison officer in Basra.
•
Support the
PCO. The Head of the US Iraq Reconstruction and
Management
Office
(IRMO) had told the UK that he wanted to work closely with the UK,
but
that he did
not want UK staff in the PCO.
117.
Mr Quarrey
commented on the DFID paper:
“Lots of
good points here about the UN and World Bank. But nothing on our
bilateral
programme
and what more we might be able to do with that …” 64
61
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction’.
62
Paper
Cabinet Office, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Developments in Key
Cities’.
63
Paper DFID,
[undated], ‘Tokyo Follow-up’.
64
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction’.
215