The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Most
people in Washington see two scenarios, each leading to war:
Security
Council
discussions collapse without agreement, in which case the UN will –
in
Bush’s eyes
– have failed the key test; or Saddam flouts a new UN resolution
on
WMD
declarations/inspections, thereby bringing the full force of the
international
community
to bear.
“The big
worry for the hardliners is a third way: that Saddam appears to …
take ‘yes’
for an
answer. If Saddam is clever, he will give UNMOVIC and the Security
Council
no cause
for complaint for months to come, until the US becomes enmeshed in
the
2004
presidential election campaign.”
457.
Sir
Christopher added:
“Assuming
we can get past the current US/French impasse … the next
argument
will
therefore be over the trigger. The White House claims to agree with
us that there
would have
to be a pattern of non‑co-operation to provide a casus belli: I do
not think
… this is
bankable. An important point for you to discuss with [Secretary]
Powell
is whether
… mobilisation has reached such a point that there is an
intolerable
contradiction
between the preferred military timetable and Blix scouring Iraq
for
months on
end.”
458.
Sir
Christopher concluded:
“We are not
yet at the moment of truth when the irresistible force meets
the
immovable
object … I appear to be in a minority of one in thinking if it all
goes
wrong in
New York, and the US is faced with going it alone, Bush may
blink.
Or, to put
it another way, what the UK decides to do in these
circumstances
could be the
decisive factor in the White House.”
459.
Sir David
Manning showed the telegram to Mr Blair, commenting: “Good
tel[egram]
on Bush:
prejudices and pressures – and continued importance of UK to
him.”156
460.
Mr Straw
spoke to both Mr de Villepin157
and Secretary
Powell158
on 12
October.
The
discussions focused primarily on the difficulties with
OP10.
461.
Mr Straw
also spoke to Mr Tang Jiaxuan on 13 October to discuss
progress.159
156
Manuscript
comments Manning to Prime Minister on Telegram 1326 Washington to
FCO London,
11 October
2002, ‘Your Visit to Washington’.
157
Telegram
220 FCO London to Paris, 12 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation with
French
Foreign Minister, 12 October’.
158
Telegram
535 FCO London to Washington, 12 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 12 October’.
159
Telegram
550 Beijing to FCO London, 14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation with
Chinese
Foreign Minister’.
282