9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
851.
Reporting on
the visit, Lt Gen Rollo recorded that Gen Petraeus confirmed
that
he had
given direction that the MND boundaries should remain as they were,
and
made clear
that he had no difficulty with a US brigade coming under the
command
852.
In Basra, ACM
Stirrup and Gen Petraeus had agreed that once Gen Mohan
had
committed
to his plan “he must not be allowed to fail”.
853.
Lt Gen Rollo
observed that, “2009 was barely discussed in any of the
discussions
over the
last week”. He continued:
“… it is
becoming increasingly apparent to me that there are risks in not
taking
decisions …
on our posture in Basra. Quite apart from the potential to confuse
our
allies,
getting things done in Iraq requires commitment, which is harder to
deliver
in an
atmosphere of unsettling uncertainty. There remains plenty to do.
So while I
accept that
it might be necessary to defer decisions for a while, the
opportunity cost
of that
approach needs to be clearly understood.”
854.
In mid-March,
Mr Browne visited Iraq with Mr Wareing.418
After
returning to the UK,
Mr Browne
wrote that:
“The
overall mood in Iraq is optimistic, reflecting the improved
security situation,
political
progress and the new focus on economic regeneration to which
Michael
[Wareing]
is contributing. Inevitably in Iraq, the pace of change is lower
than we
would wish
and no-one believes it is irreversible, but we have an opportunity
over
the next
year or so to contribute to a step-change in the country’s economy
and
to put our
bilateral relationship onto a sustainable long-term footing. That
does,
however,
mean we need to redouble our efforts now … to exploit the progress
we
have
already made.”
855.
Mr Browne
reported that Gen Mohan’s plans to “confront and face down
Basra’s
militia
later in the year” were supported by the Iraqi Government and Gen
Petraeus. The
visit had
also confirmed Mr Browne’s view that “the rate of reduction
[of troop numbers]
should be
slower than we envisaged last autumn, to deal with current threats
and to
support
this [sic] Iraqis through until after the elections”.
856.
In Baghdad,
Mr Browne judged the main focus of activity to be negotiation
of the
Long Term
Security Agreement. He observed:
“Given our
different legal systems, the LTSA may not be sufficient for
our
requirements
and, despite our best efforts, the US chose to table their draft
with the
Iraqis
before discussing it with us … I intend to send a team of our own
to Baghdad
shortly to
start formal discussions, in concert with the US if possible, on a
Status
417
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 17 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (292) 17 Mar
08’.
418
Letter
Browne to Brown, 18 March 2008, ‘Visit to Iraq and
Kuwait’.
339