12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
The ‘Police
Forward Look’ paper produced in November 2006 described TIPS
as:
“… the UK’s
biggest success story, and one where we have delivered
more
than we
promised. The scheme has developed beyond the original plan,
a
‘Crimestoppers’‑style
hotline, into a sophisticated intelligence system,
including
Former DCC
Brand told the Inquiry:
“Because we
had British policemen in there, there was a huge uptake of
people
calling in,
telling us about weapons and missiles and all sorts of things like
that …
It was so
successful that one of the last things that Mr Kerik did
before he left was
to
announce: ‘It was so successful we are now handing it over to the
Iraqis’, and all
the calls
stopped. So we had to reinstitute, because we understood after a
while that
it was …
the fact that people knew there were British police at the other
end of the
phone made
for the calls to happen, and that was a really successful part of
our small
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Former ACC Smith stated:
“TIPS in
Baghdad generated increasing ‘actionable intelligence’ for
coalition and Iraqi
Security
Forces with reports averaging from 150 per week in early 2005 to
over 400
per week by
the end of that year … TIPS was one of the real successes of the
UK
work which
… brought in a large volume of intelligence that undoubtedly saved
many
Iraqi and
coalition lives.”652
In his
report dated August 2006, Former Chief Superintendent Barton stated
that there
were 14
ArmorGroup contractors working on the TIPS hotline.653
He
added:
“The
day‑to‑day successes (terrorist related arms finds, source
development, target
development)
is extremely successful [sic] and receives accolades from
coalition
partners.
“However,
to date, whilst Iraqi staff man the telephones there is no Iraqi
‘lead’ and
no Iraqi
trainers.”
A recently
developed Basra TIPS line was described by Former Chief
Superintendent
Barton as
“new and slow to start”.
715.
Five key areas
were prioritised in DCC Smith’s report:
“•
Training:
Basic, Leadership and Developmental areas to be prioritised.
Courses
and
regional, provincial or local training arranged;
•
Police
Support Infrastructure: at Police Headquarters level – Human
Resources,
Finance
(and contracts), Communications, Logistics;
650
Paper BE
Baghdad, November 2006, ‘Police Forward Look’.
651
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 98‑99.
652
Statement,
25 June 2010, page 10.
653
Report
Barton, August 2006, ‘The window of opportunity’.
215