3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
951.
In response to
a comment from Mr Ivanov that President Bush had already
decided
to go to
war, Mr Straw responded that President Bush “would go to war
unless – and the
unless had
to be big and happen quickly”.
952.
In a
discussion on the draft resolution, Mr Straw stated that the
UK had never
taken the
position that draft text was “take it or leave it”. He had no
problem in principle
with tough
benchmarks and a very tight timeline; but if an initial 120 days
was followed
by another
120 days, “momentum would dribble away. Saddam Hussein only
responded
because of
military pressure and that could not be sustained for
ever.
953.
Mr Straw
proposed additional language for the draft resolution setting a
deadline
for a
Security Council decision on whether Iraq had “clearly begun the
process of full
active
disarmament as provided by [resolutions 1441 and 687]”, together
with a “private
understanding
about the targets Iraq had to reach”. Mr Straw was reported to
have said
that he was
“very allergic to timelines and public benchmarks” which “could
lead to a tick
in the box
mentality by Saddam and good opportunities for further game
playing”.
954.
In his
subsequent discussion with Secretary Powell, Mr Straw said
that he had told
Mr Ivanov
that he thought war could be avoided if Saddam went into exile and
there was
real
evidence that Iraq was co-operating in its own
disarmament.294
955.
Later in the
conversation, in response to a question about why Iraq was
being
targeted,
Mr Straw had replied that “Iraq was President Bush’s No.1
priority; the
international
community had no choice but to pay attention to Bush’s
priorities”.
956.
Mr Ivanov
told Mr Blair that Russia was looking for concrete demands
and
a decision
on how much time was needed to resolve the issues.
957.
In his meeting
with Mr Ivanov on 5 March, Mr Blair explained that
the threat
from terrorist
groups and unstable states meant that Iraq must be dealt with
firmly.295
The issue
was whether Iraq was co-operating to the extent required by
resolution 1441.
If the UN
route did not work on this occasion, the US would not use it for a
very long
time. If
Saddam Hussein made a genuine change, the inspectors could have as
much
time as
they liked.
958.
Mr Ivanov
had made it clear that Russia was looking for concrete demands and
a
decision on
how much time was needed to resolve all the issues; and that Russia
would
not be able
to support any decision that ran counter to its
principles.
959.
The record
described the meeting as “constructive”, but that
“everything
that Ivanov
said was consistent with his public threat of the use of a Russian
veto
of our current
draft”.
294
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with Colin Powell,
4 March’.
295
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq/Russia’.
353