6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
634.
Ms Short
was keen for DFID to support an exemplary humanitarian
effort
in any
UK-controlled sector, but DFID’s role would be constrained
by:
•
the extent
of the UN mandate; and
•
the
financial resources available (under most scenarios DFID would
want
to allocate
significant funding to UN agencies working throughout
Iraq).
635.
DFID was
doing scoping work on the role it might play if there were
a
UN mandate,
but the department did not have Ms Short’s authority to
deploy
operationally
or to make substantive plans to deploy “in an exemplary
role”.
636.
Ms Short
stated her position in Cabinet on 27 February.
637.
Ms Short held
a meeting on Iraq with DFID officials, including Dr Brewer
and
Mr Fernie,
on 24 February.277
The record
was copied to Mr Chakrabarti’s Private Office.
638.
The record
stated that there was “increased recognition across Whitehall of
the
likely
scale of post-conflict activity, and the essential nature of UN
involvement and
authority
if this was to be effectively addressed”. Ms Short emphasised the
importance
of a
“substantive” second resolution that clearly justified any action
taken under it.
She asked
officials “to keep closely abreast of the debate on the legality of
occupation
of Iraq
without any UN mandate”.
639.
Officials
reported that ORHA’s state of preparedness was “extremely
worrying”:
•
Humanitarian
plans were the most advanced, but ORHA did not yet
have
sufficient
funds, staff or capacity to deliver them.
•
Reconstruction
plans were “not nearly as well advanced as they should
have
been at
this point”.
•
Civil
administration plans were the least advanced, and ORHA “would not
be
ready by
the six week deadline they had been set”.
•
Logistical
support planning had only just begun. ORHA had “not even started
on
such vital
areas as telecommunications”.
640.
The record of
the meeting stated that Ms Short would write to Mr Blair
after
Dr Brewer’s
forthcoming visit to New York, setting out the dangers this
situation would
pose in the
event of early military action that was not authorised by the UN
and did not
enjoy wide
international support.
641.
The meeting
also considered financial issues. Although the MOD and
FCO
“appeared
to be more aware of the financial constraints, and the need for the
widest
possible
burden sharing within the international community, we [DFID] had as
yet no
clear
response to the issue of the limitation of DFID’s engagement
imposed on it by our
277
Minute
Bewes to Miller, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq contingency planning:
update’.
423