9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
Mr Blair
should voice UK concern that Iran was encouraging, financing and
possibly
arming the
Sadrists.
72.
Mr Blair spoke
to President Bush by telephone later that day and said that
the
UK considered
that the Iranians were at least encouraging and funding
Muqtada al‑Sadr,
and might
be sending him arms.35
He was
aware that the US did not entirely share
that assessment.
73.
In Mr Blair’s
view, the Iranians were concerned that they would be the
next
target
for US military action and were therefore concluding that they
should make life
more
difficult for the US in Iraq. He intended to send a personal
message to Iran via
Mr Richard
Dalton, British Ambassador to Iran, making clear that no-one was
talking
about
invading Iran, but that if they “misbehaved” on Iraq then “things
would only get
more
difficult for them”.
74.
From 15 to 18
August a National Conference was held to select an Iraqi
Interim
National
Council (IINC) of 100 members to oversee the IIG until the election
of the
Transitional
National Assembly in January 2005.36
The
Conference included a wide
range of
Iraqis: representatives of political parties, the religious
hierarchy, tribes, the
regions and
civil society.
75.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported that three methods were put forward at
the
Conference
for selecting the members of the IINC:
“… a slate
system of complete lists of 81 names, the UN’s
proportional
representation
based on the make up of the conference (which would favour
the
established
political parties) and a caucus system requiring delegates to form
ad hoc
groupings
receiving one Council seat for every 13 delegates in the
group.”37
76.
Delegates
opted for the slate system, by a “clear majority”.
77.
The IPU
assessed the conference as:
“… a
qualified success. That it took place, despite the security
situation, was an
achievement.
It generated a great deal of interest … and included some
vigorous
debates.
And it succeeded in selecting a broadly representative 100
member
National
Council, 26 percent of whom are women. It did not, however,
succeed
in drawing
in any elements on the fringes of the insurgency.”38
78.
On 18 August,
a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) assessed security in
Iraq.39
35
Letter
Quarrey to Sinclair, 11 August 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s telephone
conversation with
President
Bush, 11 August: Iraq and Iran’.
36
JIC
Assessment, 2 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Political
Prospects’.
37
Telegram
136 Baghdad to FCO London, 18 August 2004, ‘Iraq: National
Conference’.
38
Submission
Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’ attaching
Paper Iraq
Policy Unit, 27 August 2004 ‘Iraq: Next Steps’ and Letter Charlton
to Phillipson,
24 August
2004, ‘Iraq’.
39
CIG
Assessment 18 August 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
407