The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
threat, the
strategic decision that this was a better course than unilateral
action was
right. It
would be “important to show that we were serious about allowing the
UN to
do its business”.
112.
Following that
meeting, Sir David Manning told Dr Rice that Mr Blair and
Mr Straw
were
“pleased that the new draft resolution focused on the destruction
of Iraq’s WMD,
and the
regime that would govern UNMOVIC inspections. This was the right
place to
be but
there was one area of the draft in particular that continued to
give us serious
difficulties.”33
That was
the stipulation that Iraq must make a declaration of its
holdings
within 15
days of the passage of the resolution. He and Dr Rice had
discussed the
issues many
times, including the likely response of other Security Council
members.
They
discussed the language on that point and in the final operative
paragraphs [OPs]
and the
regime for inspections.
113.
Reporting the
discussions Sir David Manning wrote that he had been assured
that
the
resolution was not a “trigger” for military action and that he had
told Dr Rice that he
expected
the discussions on the resolution to be difficult:
“They would
be particularly resistant to the reference in OP10 to ‘…
authorises
Member
States to use all necessary means’. We were very unlikely to get
this, even
though we
should press it to see how the other Security Council members
reacted.
Condi
agreed. She said that the Administration was privately prepared to
concede
this and
settle for something like ‘serious consequences’.”
114.
Sir David
concluded that the UK had “done as much as we can in the last 48
hours
to get the
resolution into something approaching a plausible shape”. The UK
would now
have to
wait to see the reactions to the draft.
115.
On 20
September, the MOD sought Mr Blair’s agreement to offer
Package 3
as a
“possible add‑on” to the US “for planning purposes”.
116.
In parallel
with the discussions on a new UN resolution, military planning
continued
although
knowledge was kept to a very tight group of people and the
sensitivities about
potential
leaks remained.
117.
In response to
a minute from Mr Jim Drummond, Assistant Head of OD
Sec
(Foreign
Policy), primarily about military planning which Mr Drummond
had classified
‘Confidential’,
Sir David Manning commented: “Please ensure all minuting is Secret
and
Personal –
and keep circulation to [the] barest minimum.”34
33
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
34
Manuscript
comment Manning on Minute Drummond to Manning, 16 September
2002,
‘Iraq: Pigott Meeting’.
218