9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
351.
The paper
attached to Mr Straw’s letter explained that the Constitution
deferred
critical
decisions to a future elected Council of Representatives, which
risked future
conflicts
between a weakened central government and increasingly assertive
regions.
The
following areas were likely to be controversial:
•
Federalism:
the latitude that the Constitution gave regional authorities
to
maintain a
significant armed force would increase the anxiety of Sunni
Arabs
and others
who claimed that federalism would lead to
fragmentation.
•
Natural
resources: the language of the Constitution was a “model
of
imprecision”.
•
Role of
Islam: the extent to which Islam would influence the
legislative
programme
remained to be determined.
•
Kirkuk: the
Kurdish desire for a referendum was made explicit. Kirkuk would
be
free to
form a region or join another region, and the potential for a rise
in ethnic
tension and
violence was high.
352.
Mr Straw’s
letter was not shown to Mr Blair.155
353.
On 13 October,
Mr Straw told Cabinet that “contrary to original expectations”
the
timetable
for transition to democratic government in Iraq set out in
resolution 1546 had
“so far,
kept to time”.156
He
commented that that was “impressive”.
354.
Mr Straw
expected that turnout for the constitutional referendum would be
high,
and there
would be a two-thirds majority in most provinces.
355.
Mr Blair
said that he was encouraged by the political progress being
made,
although
the security situation remained a cause for concern. He quoted a UN
poll which
showed the
population split roughly 50/50 on whether things were getting
better or
worse. The
main issue seemed to be lack of electricity.
356.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq from 10
to
13 October
and sent an account of his visit to Gen Walker.157
He
commented:
“This was a
sobering visit in comparison to my last one in April, when the
post
election-euphoria
[sic] was still palpable and the campaign was being looked
at
through
somewhat rose-tinted spectacles. I detected little such optimism on
this visit:
the
atmosphere was rather more gritty …
“My
analysis will appear gloomy; intentionally so. Though there is no
sense of
defeatism
in theatre, the possibility of strategic failure was mentioned in
earnest on
this visit
more than on any before. Everyone agreed that the next 6-12 months
would
155
Letter
Foreign Secretary to DOP(I) Committee Members, 13 October 2005,
‘Iraq: Constitution Paper’
including
manuscript comments Quarrey and Sheinwald.
156
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 October 2005.
157
Minute CGS
to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 10-13 Oct
05’.
547