6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
610.
The MOD
reported that US planners increasingly considered operations
from
Turkey were
“integral to the success of the campaign plan” (earlier drafts said
“key”),
although
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had yet to be briefed on this
plan.
611.
The MOD also
drew attention to the “sketchy” post‑conflict plans and
the
importance
of keeping in mind the US timetable when identifying the
potential
contribution
the UK might offer and the influence it was hoped to
bring.
612.
The MOD advice
concluded that, should “US military preparations continue at
their
current
pace, we will face some early tough decisions within two weeks of
your return
from Camp
David”.
613.
Copies of the
letter were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw
and
Sir Andrew Turnbull,
who became Cabinet Secretary in September 2002, and to
Mr Desmond
Bowen, who succeeded Mr McKane as Deputy Head of OD
Sec.
614.
On 5
September, Lt Gen Pigott’s staff also provided Adm Boyce
with a list of key
questions
he might pose to Gen Myers and the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe
(SACEUR, a
NATO post held by a US commander, who also commands
EUCOM),
to inform
the UK’s thinking and assess the merits of US
plans.244
615.
The questions
included:
•
the
robustness of the plan to withstand a CBRN attack and the lines
of
communications
to withstand asymmetric attack;
•
whether the
northern axis was fundamental to the US plan;
•
if the US
required a UK ground forces presence, would it be prepared to
wait;
•
US views on
the length of post‑conflict engagement;
•
regional
reactions; and
•
the best
and worst post‑conflict outcome they envisaged.
616.
The MOD has
been unable to find a record of Adm Boyce’s
discussions.245
617.
On 5
September, Maj Gen Wilson told Maj Gen Fry that
Gen Franks was
“comfortable”
with having US troops under UK command; and that he saw “more
political
attraction
in UK, rather than the US leading ‘in the North’”.246
618.
Lt Gen Pigott
accompanied Mr Blair on his visit to Camp
David.247
244
Email DOMA
AD(ME) to CDS/PSO, 5 September 2002, ‘CDS Questions on Iraq for
SACEUR/CJCS’.
245
Letter MOD
Iraq Inquiry Unit to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 23 May
2012.
246
Minute
Wilson to DCJO (Ops), 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq Contingency
Planning’.
247
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
267