The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Iraq still
lacked “fissile material and the infrastructure to make
it”.
•
If Iraq were
“able to acquire sufficient fissile [material] for a weapon or
centrifuges
and feed
material from outside Iraq”, the time periods to manufacture a
crude
nuclear
weapon and a nuclear warhead could, “with foreign assistance”,
be
“significantly
shortened, with or without current controls”.
42.
The JIC’s
conclusions in relation to Iraq’s threat to its neighbours are set
out in
Section
1.2.
43.
The Butler
Report stated that the intelligence supporting the judgements on
Iraq’s
research
and development programmes for ballistic missiles “came from a
range of
sources”,
and was “substantial”.15
44.
Addressing the
intelligence underpinning the Assessment on Iraq’s
nuclear
activities,
the Butler Report stated:
•
Intelligence
had detected a visit of Iraqi officials to Niger in
1999,16
and
some
details had
subsequently been confirmed by Iraq. The purpose of the visit
was
not
immediately known but, in the circumstances, including Iraq’s
previous
purchases
of uranium ore from Niger, the JIC judged that the purchase
of
uranium ore
could have been the subject of discussions and noted
that
unconfirmed
intelligence indicated Iraqi interest in acquiring
uranium.17
•
“There was
further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi
regime
had also
made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the
Democratic
•
The
description of the intelligence underpinning the statement on
Iraq’s interest
in
acquiring uranium from Africa was “represented correctly by the
JIC”.19
•
The
statements in the Assessment about Iraqi attempts to procure dual
use
equipment
that could be used in association with a centrifuge programme
fairly
represented
the intelligence.20
15
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
248.
16
The Butler
Report stated: “This visit was separate from the Iraqi-Nigerien
discussions, in the margins
of the
mid-1999 Organisation of African Unity meeting in Algiers, attested
to by Ambassador Wilson in his
book ‘The
Politics of Truth’” (Carroll & Graf, 2004, page
28).
17
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
493.
18
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
494.
19
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
220.
20
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
220.
20