Previous page | Contents | Next page
4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
proof” that Saddam Hussein was “lying over his WMD, to bring public opinion to accept
the need for military action”.79
185.  On 24 January, Mr Scarlett provided a note with a list of points summarising the
assessment of Iraqi WMD holdings and concealment policy which could be “deployed
publicly” by Mr Blair.80
186.  Mr Scarlett wrote:
“For the most part the note repackages the contents of the September dossier
bringing out the key points, including quantities of WMD more clearly. There is some
limited updating to cover the work of UNMOVIC and concealment activities.”
187.  The key points in the note included:
Judgements in the dossier:
“Iraq has a useable [sic] chemical and biological weapons capability, which
includes recent production of chemical and biological agents, and military plans
to use them;
Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons;
Iraq possesses up to twenty 650km Al Hussein missiles, is developing
longer‑range ballistic missiles, and is extending its shorter range systems
beyond the UN permitted range of 150km.”
Iraq’s declaration of 7 December 2002:
Iraq had “not taken the opportunity … to explain the issues outstanding from
UNSCOM’s report to the UN Security Council in 1999”.
Iraq maintained that it currently had “no proscribed WMD programmes”.
The UN already had the “majority of information” in the declaration.
The declaration did “not alter UK assessments of Iraq’s WMD programmes”.
Chemical weapons:
Iraq could produce mustard gas, tabun, sarin and VX nerve agents.
Iraq had had “chemical weapons available from both pre-Gulf War stocks and
more recent production”.
The UK did “not know exactly how much CW agent” was available. While it
believed current holdings were “less than” the 360 tonnes for which UNSCOM
had been unable to account, it was “still enough to fill many artillery shells or
other weapons”.
79  Minute Rycroft to Manning, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Jeremy Greenstock’.
80  Minute Scarlett to Rycroft, 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Intelligence Points for the Prime Minister’
attaching Note, ‘Iraq:WMD’.
325
Previous page | Contents | Next page